All text, translations, and maps copyrighted by Lawrence Douglas Ringer. Last modified on: 11-April-2016.
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In response to the infighting amongst the Arkadians, the Thebans under the command of Epameinondas once again led their allies in a campaign into the Peloponnesos in 362 BCE. This was the fourth major Theban campaign into the Peloponnesos led by Epameinondas and the first since a bungled expedition into Akhaia five years earlier in ca. 367 BCE. This modest record of campaigning certainly does not leave the impression that the Thebans were intent upon enslaving the Peloponnesians as Xenophon contended!
In any case, it is unclear whether or not the Thebans had received an official summons for military assistance from the Arkadian League. Unfortunately, we do not know much about the then current state of affairs within the league. We know from Xenophon that the Tegeatans, Megalopolitans, Aseateans, and Pallanteans—all in southern Arkadia on the Lakedaimonian frontier—were anti-Lakedaimonian and that the Mantineans felt threatened by the democratic arkhontes (chief magistrates) of the Arkadian League. Evidentally, the attempted arrests of the Mantinean leaders at Tegea the previous year in 363 BCE had convinced the Mantinean aristocrats to seek safety in an alliance with the pro-oligarchical Lakedaimonians (Spartans). So far as we can tell, this political reversal did not lead to class warfare in Mantinea.[1] As for the many other cities of Arkadia, we know next to nothing about their politics. We do know, however, that the Arkadian League continued to exist in some form or another with Megalopolis as the chief city for several decades following the battle of Mantinea.
Regrettably, Xenophon failed to comment in detail upon these matters, which certainly gives the impression that the justification for the campaign must have reflected badly upon the Arkadian oligarchs and/or the Lakedaimonians (Spartans). Perhaps, the Thebans did receive an official summons from the Arkadian League and perhaps the vast majority of Arkadians remained loyal members of the league. In any event, the objective of the Thebans was apparently to reconcile—by force obviously—the Arkadian city of Mantinea with the remaining democratic members of the Arkadian League, but also to prevent other Peloponnesians from allying with the Lakedaimonians.
PHASE ONE MANOEUVRES
The Theban allied army that invaded the Peloponnesos in 362 BCE consisted of “all of the Boiotians, the Euboians, and polys (many) of the Thessalians from Alexander as well as his opponents”. The great Theban general Pelopidas had been slain two years earlier in 364 BCE at the battle of Kynoskephalai in Thessaly while commanding the army of the Thessalian League. Pelopidas had defeated the Thessalian tyrant Alexander of Pherai in this battle and subsequently Alexander had been forced to become a Theban ally. As a result, the Theban allied army included troops not only from the Thessalian League but from Alexander of Pherai as well. The Phokians declined to join the Thebans claiming that their alliance was a defensive one. Diodoros (15.85.2) included the Lokrians in the Theban army, which is certainly credible. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.4)
Having arrived in the Peloponnesos, the Theban commander Epameinondas at first lingered at Nemea south of Korinth hoping to intercept the Athenian army. The Thebans were likely joined by their allies from Argos while at Nemea or on their subsequent march south. According to Diodoros (15.85.2), the Sikyonians fought in the Theban army and, if that is correct, then in all probability they also joined the Thebans at Nemea. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.5–6)
In the meanwhile, a hostile force consisting of the Lakedaimonians (Spartans), Eleians, Akhaians, and some Arkadians—most notably the Mantineans—was gathering together at Mantinea in order to defend the city. The Lakedaimonian advance force that was already assembled at Mantinea consisted of “all of their horsemen, their mercenaries, and three of the twelve lokhoi (companies)” of Lakedaimonian hoplites. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.7, 7.5.10, 7.5.18)
PHASE TWO MANOEUVRES
Having received false intelligence that the Athenians were planning to come by sea, Epameinondas then moved his forces to Tegea south of Mantinea. It was more than likely at Tegea that the Thebans were joined by their remaining Peloponnesian allies including the Messenians and some of the Arkadians, the most important of whom were the Tegeatans and Megalopolitans. Their position at Tegea afforded the Thebans the opportunity to split their opponents’ forces and that was exactly what happened. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.5, 7.5.7)
While encamped inside the city of Tegea in southeastern Arkadia, Epameinondas learned that his adversaries were keeping watch around about Mantinea and had summoned the Lakedaimonian (Spartan) king Agesilaos and all of the remaining Lakedaimonians. In other words, the army at Mantinea was stationary and was taking a defensive posture while waiting for reinforcements. Epameinondas also learned that King Agesilaos was at Pellana in Lakonike marching north to reinforce the Lakedaimonian allied army at Mantinea and no doubt to take command. By advancing to Pellana, Agesilaos was obviously planning to march northwest via Pellana and Belbina/Belemina and then north past Pallantion thereby bypassing the enemy stronghold of Tegea. Upon reaching Pellana, Agesilaos may have received his first—no doubt disturbing—reports that a large Theban allied army was now at Tegea. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.8–7.5.9)
PHASE THREE MANOEUVRES
Though Agesilaos was much nearer to Lakedaimon (Sparta) than the Thebans, he lacked cavalry. That being the case, Epameinondas attempted to surprise the city of Lakedaimon by a forced march in all likelihood spearheaded by his own numerous cavalry. Epameinondas undoubtedly took the route south from Tegea via Karyai and Sellasia towards Lakedaimon. Some of his troops may have taken the more direct route between Tegea and Lakedaimon via the Klisoura defile, but this difficult route lacked water and was therefore unsuitable for the bulk of the Theban army. Be that as it may, King Agesilaos was alerted to this bold ploy by a Kretan—perhaps a scout or forager—and managed to return to Lakedaimon ahead of the Thebans in time to prepare its defenses. Agesilaos’ son Arkhidamos was conspicuous in his bravery and repelled a Theban attack inside the city, which proudly lacked defensive walls and fortifications. However, Arkhidamos—leading “not even a hundred men”—pursued too far and was driven back with losses. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.9–13)
As related by Plutarch (ca. 45–125 CE), Epameinondas set out at night and actually managed to parallaxas (pass by) Agesilaos in his dash towards Lakedaimon (Sparta). However, Plutarch wrote that, according to the historian Kallisthenes (floruit mid-Fourth Century BCE), Agesilaos was apprised of the Theban advance by Euthynos of Thespiai. The Boiotian city of Thespiai had been destroyed by the Thebans prior to the autumn of 371 BCE, so Euthynos may have been a Thespiean exile serving in the Lakedaimonian army. Plutarch, who was well read, also mentioned Xenophon’s assertion that Agesilaos had been forwarned by a Kretan. Of course, Agesilaos likely received multiple reports of enemy movements. In any event, Agesilaos was able to give advance warning to the city by a horseman and shortly thereafter Agesilaos himself returned to the city ahead of the Theban river crossing. Both Agesilaos and his son Arkhidamos then vigorously defended the unwalled city and repelled the Theban allied army. (Plutarch. Agesilaos 34.3–8)
Some of the Theban cavalry may have in fact appeared on the opposite bank of the Eurotas River ahead of the returning Lakedaimonians (Spartans) only to find the bridge already defended thanks to Agesilaos’ warning. The Theban allied army may then have forded the Eurotas River opposite the town of Amyklai—a few kilometres south of the bridge at Lakedaimon—as they had during the invasion of the winter of 370/369 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 6.5.27, 6.5.30). The arrival of the Theban infantry vanguard behind their cavalry, a march of several kilometres downriver to a point opposite Amyklai, the fording of the Eurotas River, and a march of several kilometres back upriver would have given Agesilaos sufficient time to complete his short journey from Pellana. Thus the accounts of Xenophon and Plutarch would have been in basic agreement.[2]
Meanwhile, the Athenian cavalry set out from Eleusis and took a meal at the Isthmos in the vicinity of Korinth. Xenophon cryptically stated that some dystykhēma (ill luck, misfortune) befell the Athenian horsemen at Korinth. Perhaps, the Athenian cavalry had engaged in pillaging to obtain provisions for their meal and had been attacked by the irate Korinthians. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.15–16)
This unexplained ‘misfortune’ may have been linked to a falling out between the Athenians and Korinthians four years earlier in ca. 366 BCE. At that time, the Korinthians had feared that the Athenians were planning on garrisoning Korinth without consulting the Korinthians! This suspicion had led the Korinthians—who were allies of the Lakedaimonians (Spartans)—to expel their Athenian confederates and to make peace—but not an alliance—with Thebes. Other Lakedaimonian allies including the Phleiasians had also joined the Korinthians in making peace with the Thebans. Consequently, Korinth and these other states were evidently neutral during the current conflict. The Korinthian alliance with Lakedaimon was a defensive accord and—so far as the Korinthians knew—the home territory of the Lakedaimonians was not threatened at this time. As a result, Korinth’s peace treaty with the Thebans remained in effect. In any event, there may still have been ill feelings between the Athenians and Korinthians over the events of ca. 366 BCE. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.4.4–10) [3]
PHASE FOUR MANOEUVRES
Xenophon presented this failed Theban attack on Lakedaimon (Sparta) as a phenomenal Lakedaimonian victory against overwhelming odds. He also reported that Epameinondas was worried about the arrival of the army from Mantinea and noted that Epameinondas had “no desire to fight all of the Lakedaimonians together [with their allies from Mantinea]”. Having failed to surprise Lakedaimon (Sparta), a foiled Epameinondas did not tarry, but rapidly marched back north into Arkadia. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.14)
Xenophon’s account obscured the fact that Agesilaos and Arkhidamos had been deftly outmanoeuvred by Epameinondas! The wily Theban had succeeded in pinning Lakedaimon’s two most experienced and talented commanders in Sparta while he himself adroitly returned to Arkadia to engage the Lakedaimonian allied army at Mantinea! Epameinondas also prevented the Lakedaimonians from reinforcing their hoplites at Mantinea, where—as already mentioned—only three of the twelve Lakedaimonian lokhoi (companies) of hoplites were serving! A great general would, of course, have had “no desire” to allow his opponents to join their forces together! And a truly great general such as Epameinondas would ensure that they didn’t!
Arriving back at Tegea in southeast Arkadia, Epameinondas briefly rested his hoplites while immediately sending his cavalry on ahead to Mantinea in hopes of catching the Mantinean livestock and farmers outside the city walls as it was harvest time. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.14)
In the meanwhile, having arrived in Mantinea from the Isthmos via Kleonai, some of the Athenian cavalry were in the process of being quartered within houses inside Mantinea’s walls while others were still approaching the city when the Theban cavalry was spotted riding toward Mantinea. According to Polybios (9.8.11), the Athenians and Thebans caught sight of each other at midday as the Theban prōtoporeia (vanguard) reached the temple of Poseidon [Hippios] seven stadia (roughly 1.3 kilometres) from the city. The Mantineans begged the Athenians for help as their livestock and workmen were indeed still outside as well as many children and the elderly of the free populace. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.15)
According to Xenophon, the battle of Mantinea consisted of two separate engagements. First, there was a cavalry skirmish outside the walls of Mantinea between the Athenian cavalry versus the Theban and Thessalian horsemen. Secondly, the actual battle took place a day or so later between the full forces of both sides. Most other ancient writers conflate these two engagements into a single battle. The contemporary Xenophon was surely in a position to have known the correct details of this campaign in which his two sons took part.[4]
THE HIPPOMAKHIA (CAVALRY BATTLE)
Upon hearing the pleas of the Mantineans, the Athenian cavalry immediately sallied forth even though neither they nor their horses had been fed. It should be pointed out that Xenophon failed to give credit to the Theban allied cavalry, who had participated in the night-time dash to Lakedaimon (Sparta), the subsequent rapid march back to Tegea, and then the dash on to Mantinea. They and their mounts must have been exhausted and like the Athenian cavalry they were also possibly unfed. In any event, the Athenian cavalry swiftly dashed out against their opponents even though the Athenians saw that they were much more numerous and that they were Thebans and Thessalians, who had a reputation as the very best cavalry. By their bravery, the Athenian cavalry saved all of the Mantineans outside the city walls! Xenophon noted that the Athenians did not abandon the bodies of their friends and gave back the enemy dead under a truce. These were the actions of victors and indicated that the Theban allied cavalry had conceded defeat. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.15–17)
Plutarch (ca. 45–125 CE) did not give a full report of the campaign or battle, but briefly presented this cavalry skirmish as a preliminary engagement in which the Athenians arrived at the last minute and saved Mantinea from the hands of Epameinondas. He described a “violent hippomakhia (cavalry battle) under the gates and walls” of Mantinea. (Plutarch. Whether the Athenians are More Honoured for War or for Wisdom 2)
Xenophon did not mention why the other Lakedaimonian (Spartan) allied cavalry failed to help the Athenians. Perhaps they were too unprepared to deal with the sudden appearance of the Thebans and Thessalians. In addition, this cavalry skirmish was likely brief as the Theban allied cavalry were undoubtedly exhausted and had expected to encounter only livestock and farmers.
Xenophon made a very curious comment about this cavalry skirmish. He stated that the Athenians “passionately desired to recover their ancestral honour”! It is not at all clear to what event or events Xenophon was referring. Had the Athenians behaved dishonourablely during their recent dystykhēma (ill luck, misfortune) at Korinth? (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.16)
According to Plutarch, the battle of Mantinea was fought on the twelveth day of Skirophorion (an Athenian month roughly equivalent to June/July). However, Plutarch was clearly referring to this cavalry skirmish as he described the contest as a victory won by the Athenians “monoi (on their own) … over their victorious opponents”! Normally such a statement would be considered strangely contradictory, but in this case it makes sense as the Athenian cavalry defeated the Theban allied cavalry in this skirmish and then later the Thebans were victorious in the main battle! Plutarch’s date is in agreement with Xenophon’s statement that it was harvest time. The wheat harvest in the Peloponnesos was apparently in June/July. (Plutarch. Whether the Athenians are More Honoured for War or for Wisdom 7)
THE DEATH OF XENOPHON’S SON GRYLLOS
The two sons of Xenophon—Gryllos and Diodoros—fought in the Athenian contingent at Mantinea as Lakedaimonian (Spartan) allies. Gryllos, a member of the Athenian cavalry, was killed in the fighting. (Diogenes Laertios 2.6.53–54)
Xenophon was discreet and professional in his reporting of this matter and did not mention his sons in his account. However, he did lavish praise upon the performance of the victorious Athenian cavalry in this skirmish outside the walls of Mantinea. No doubt writing as a proud, loving father, Xenophon asked “Who would not marvel at the aretē (excellence, courage, manliness) of these men?”, “good, brave men slain”. Xenophon also melodramatically tugged at his readers’ heartstrings by writing that the Athenian cavalry rescued children and elderly citizens from the dastardly Thebans! Based on Xenophon’s over-the-top praise of the Athenians in the cavalry skirmish, it seems pretty obvious that his son Gryllos was slain in this engagement that saved the Mantineans who were caught outside the city walls prior to the actual battle. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.15–17)
Pausanias the periēgētēs (ca. 115–180 CE) wrote about 500 years after the battle of Mantinea. He was not a historian. Instead, Pausanias was a very knowledgeable periēgētēs, a guide or author of geographical descriptions, who was generally very reliable when reporting what he personally saw. Pausanias saw a stele of a horseman in Mantinea “ou porrō (not too far) from a theatre” that the Mantineans had dedicated to Gryllos “entha epesen (where he fell)”. Today there are remains of a Fourth Century BCE theatre in the centre of the ruins of Mantinea. Both Xenophon and Plutarch described this cavalry battle as having taken place outside the city walls, so there is a problem with Pausanias’ account. Perhaps in Pausanias’ day there was another theatre outside the walls of Mantinea. Or perhaps Pausanias’ words “ou porrō (not too far) from a theatre” are not very precise. Or perhaps the stele was not placed where Gryllos actually fell. Perhaps a wounded Gryllos was carried inside the city by his Mantinean allies and died near the Fourth Century BCE theatre. In any event, it is clear that Gryllos must have fallen somewhere near the city where the cavalry skirmish had taken place and not on the battlefield, which was roughly 5.5 kilometres south of Mantinea. (Pausanias. 8.9.5, 8.11.6)
The Mantineans considered that Xenophon’s son Gryllos had been the bravest of those who fought on their side in this battle. The Athenian hipparch (cavalry commander) Kephisodoros was considered to have been the second bravest and was also slain in the fighting. Diogenes Laertios (2.54) concurred that Kephisodoros was the name of the Athenian hipparch at Mantinea. (Pausanias. 8.9.10)
Both Plutarch and Pausanias the periēgētēs referred to a painting of this hippomakhia (cavalry battle) by Euphranor of Athens. Plutarch described Euphranor’s portrayal of the battle as “ouk anenthousiastōs (not unimpassioned)”, which in ancient Greek is actually an emphatic compliment. Pausanias saw Euphranor’s painting in the Kerameikos (Potter’s Quarter) in Athens and also a copy in Mantinea. Pausanias wrote that the painting depicted Gryllos, the son of Xenophon, amongst the Athenians as well as Epameinondas serving in the Boiotian cavalry. Pausanias was a good reporter in the sense that he reported what the locals told him, but he rarely made a comment indicating whether or not he believed them. In this case, the identification of Gryllos and Epameinondas was likely an overly creative interpretation made up by local exēgētai (tourist guides) in order to glorify their fellow citizens and to impress tourists.[5] It is worth noting that Plutarch did not give names to any of the persons depicted in the painting. (Plutarch. Whether the Athenians are More Honoured for War or for Wisdom 2; Pausanias. 1.3.4, 8.9.8)
GO TO PART THREE
[1]↩ According to Diodoros (15.59.1), Lykomedes of Tegea [sic] had persuaded the Arkadians to form the Arkadian League. Pausanias the periēgētēs (8.27.2) listed Lykomedes of Mantinea as one of the oikistai (founders) of Megalopolis, the new ‘capital’ of the Arkadian League. Lykomedes of Mantinea had led a unit of 5,000 Arkadians known as the epilektoi (chosen) just before and just after the Theban allied invasion of Lakonike during the winter of 370/369 BCE (Diodoros 15.62.2, 15.67.2). So, Lykomedes had likely commanded the Arkadian contingent during the invasion itself. Typical of his selective reporting, Xenophon (Hellēnika 7.1.23–24, 7.1.39, 7.4.2–3) only mentioned Lykomedes of Mantinea when he quarrelled with the Thebans and when he was assassinated abroad a few years prior to the battle of Mantinea! In any event, it was likely the death of Lykomedes that resulted in the rise to power of a Mantinean faction that was less devoted to the Arkadian League than Lykomedes had been.
[2]↩ Polyainos (2.3.10) wrote that Epameinondas made a night attack upon an empty Lakedaimon (Sparta), but that Agesilaos was alerted by automoloi (persons who were AWOL or deserters) and as a result arrived back ahead of the Thebans and repelled their attack upon the city.
Frontinus (3.11.5) reported that Epameinondas was “a transfuga proditus (betrayed by a deserter)” and as a result actually abandoned his march against Sparta!
[3]↩ This state of affairs in ca. 366 BCE apparently led to the seizure of power by the tyrant Timophanes, who had been placed in command of a troop of mercenaries ironically hired to defend the independence of Korinth. In ca. 364 BCE, Timophanes was assassinated at the instigation of his brother Timoleon, who detested tyrants. In 344 BCE with “skhedon (roughly) twenty years having elapsed”, Timoleon of Korinth would justly rise to fame as the liberator of Syracuse (a Korinthian colony) and indeed of all of the Greek cities of Sicily! Xenophon did not mention either Timophanes or Timoleon, who did not become famous until approximately a decade after Xenophon’s death. However, Xenophon (Hellēnika 7.4.6) did mention the mercenary infantry and cavalry that the Korinthians hired following their expulsion of their Athenian allies. (Plutarch. Timoleon)
[4]↩ The brief summary of this campaign as given by the respected historian Polybios of Megalopolis (ca. before 199 to 120 BCE) surprisingly makes little sense! Polybios reported that Epameninondas was at Tegea and the Lakedaimonians with their full force along with their allies were mustered together at Mantinea. After nightfall, Epameinondas led his army against Lakedaimon (Sparta) and reached the deserted city at the third hour. Strangely Epameinondas failed to take the city. An automolos (person who was AWOL or a deserter) warned Agesilaos in Mantinea and the Lakedaimonian allied army miraculously arrived in Sparta in the nick of time to save the city! The automolos would presumably have had to travel the approximately 17 kilometres from Tegea to Mantinea to warn Agesilaos and then Agesilaos would have had to march those same 17 kilometres—about half a day’s march for infantry—before even arriving at Epameinondas’ starting point. How Agesilaos could have managed to arrive in time in Lakedaimon is beyond belief. In any event, Epameinondas then led his army back into Arkadia hoping to capture Mantinea bereft of defenders. However, the Athenians arrived just in time to save Mantinea from the Thebans! Polybios did not describe the return march of the Lakedaimonian allied army nor the battle itself! (Polybios. 9.8)
[5]↩ Pausanias (8.11.6) further claimed that, in accordance with both the Athenian and Theban accounts, the painting depicted Gryllos wounding Epameinondas. In another passage, Pausanias (9.15.5) asserted that the painting of the cavalry battle depicted Gryllos, the son of Xenophon, slaying Epameinondas! There actually isn’t any difference between these two versions as according to most accounts Epameinondas was mortally wounded and carried from the battlefield still alive. Needless to say, all indications are that Gryllos died in the cavalry skirmish outside the walls of Mantinea whereas Epameinondas died a day or two later in the battle south of Mantinea! So much for the tall tales told by local exēgētai (tourist guides)!
If you encounter a word or spelling with which you are unfamiliar, be sure to check the glossaries (see the links on the right under Reference Aids).
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| The Battlefield of Mantinea, Arkadia, Greece. (Image compliments of www.utexas.edu) |
THE CAMPAIGN OF MANTINEA 362 BCE
In response to the infighting amongst the Arkadians, the Thebans under the command of Epameinondas once again led their allies in a campaign into the Peloponnesos in 362 BCE. This was the fourth major Theban campaign into the Peloponnesos led by Epameinondas and the first since a bungled expedition into Akhaia five years earlier in ca. 367 BCE. This modest record of campaigning certainly does not leave the impression that the Thebans were intent upon enslaving the Peloponnesians as Xenophon contended!
In any case, it is unclear whether or not the Thebans had received an official summons for military assistance from the Arkadian League. Unfortunately, we do not know much about the then current state of affairs within the league. We know from Xenophon that the Tegeatans, Megalopolitans, Aseateans, and Pallanteans—all in southern Arkadia on the Lakedaimonian frontier—were anti-Lakedaimonian and that the Mantineans felt threatened by the democratic arkhontes (chief magistrates) of the Arkadian League. Evidentally, the attempted arrests of the Mantinean leaders at Tegea the previous year in 363 BCE had convinced the Mantinean aristocrats to seek safety in an alliance with the pro-oligarchical Lakedaimonians (Spartans). So far as we can tell, this political reversal did not lead to class warfare in Mantinea.[1] As for the many other cities of Arkadia, we know next to nothing about their politics. We do know, however, that the Arkadian League continued to exist in some form or another with Megalopolis as the chief city for several decades following the battle of Mantinea.
Regrettably, Xenophon failed to comment in detail upon these matters, which certainly gives the impression that the justification for the campaign must have reflected badly upon the Arkadian oligarchs and/or the Lakedaimonians (Spartans). Perhaps, the Thebans did receive an official summons from the Arkadian League and perhaps the vast majority of Arkadians remained loyal members of the league. In any event, the objective of the Thebans was apparently to reconcile—by force obviously—the Arkadian city of Mantinea with the remaining democratic members of the Arkadian League, but also to prevent other Peloponnesians from allying with the Lakedaimonians.
PHASE ONE MANOEUVRES
The Theban allied army that invaded the Peloponnesos in 362 BCE consisted of “all of the Boiotians, the Euboians, and polys (many) of the Thessalians from Alexander as well as his opponents”. The great Theban general Pelopidas had been slain two years earlier in 364 BCE at the battle of Kynoskephalai in Thessaly while commanding the army of the Thessalian League. Pelopidas had defeated the Thessalian tyrant Alexander of Pherai in this battle and subsequently Alexander had been forced to become a Theban ally. As a result, the Theban allied army included troops not only from the Thessalian League but from Alexander of Pherai as well. The Phokians declined to join the Thebans claiming that their alliance was a defensive one. Diodoros (15.85.2) included the Lokrians in the Theban army, which is certainly credible. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.4)
Having arrived in the Peloponnesos, the Theban commander Epameinondas at first lingered at Nemea south of Korinth hoping to intercept the Athenian army. The Thebans were likely joined by their allies from Argos while at Nemea or on their subsequent march south. According to Diodoros (15.85.2), the Sikyonians fought in the Theban army and, if that is correct, then in all probability they also joined the Thebans at Nemea. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.5–6)
In the meanwhile, a hostile force consisting of the Lakedaimonians (Spartans), Eleians, Akhaians, and some Arkadians—most notably the Mantineans—was gathering together at Mantinea in order to defend the city. The Lakedaimonian advance force that was already assembled at Mantinea consisted of “all of their horsemen, their mercenaries, and three of the twelve lokhoi (companies)” of Lakedaimonian hoplites. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.7, 7.5.10, 7.5.18)
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| Phase One Manoeuvres According to Xenophon. Blue = Thebans and allies. Pink = Lakedaimonians and allies. |
PHASE TWO MANOEUVRES
Having received false intelligence that the Athenians were planning to come by sea, Epameinondas then moved his forces to Tegea south of Mantinea. It was more than likely at Tegea that the Thebans were joined by their remaining Peloponnesian allies including the Messenians and some of the Arkadians, the most important of whom were the Tegeatans and Megalopolitans. Their position at Tegea afforded the Thebans the opportunity to split their opponents’ forces and that was exactly what happened. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.5, 7.5.7)
While encamped inside the city of Tegea in southeastern Arkadia, Epameinondas learned that his adversaries were keeping watch around about Mantinea and had summoned the Lakedaimonian (Spartan) king Agesilaos and all of the remaining Lakedaimonians. In other words, the army at Mantinea was stationary and was taking a defensive posture while waiting for reinforcements. Epameinondas also learned that King Agesilaos was at Pellana in Lakonike marching north to reinforce the Lakedaimonian allied army at Mantinea and no doubt to take command. By advancing to Pellana, Agesilaos was obviously planning to march northwest via Pellana and Belbina/Belemina and then north past Pallantion thereby bypassing the enemy stronghold of Tegea. Upon reaching Pellana, Agesilaos may have received his first—no doubt disturbing—reports that a large Theban allied army was now at Tegea. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.8–7.5.9)
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| Phase Two Manoeuvres According to Xenophon. Blue = Thebans and allies. Pink = Lakedaimonians and allies. |
PHASE THREE MANOEUVRES
Though Agesilaos was much nearer to Lakedaimon (Sparta) than the Thebans, he lacked cavalry. That being the case, Epameinondas attempted to surprise the city of Lakedaimon by a forced march in all likelihood spearheaded by his own numerous cavalry. Epameinondas undoubtedly took the route south from Tegea via Karyai and Sellasia towards Lakedaimon. Some of his troops may have taken the more direct route between Tegea and Lakedaimon via the Klisoura defile, but this difficult route lacked water and was therefore unsuitable for the bulk of the Theban army. Be that as it may, King Agesilaos was alerted to this bold ploy by a Kretan—perhaps a scout or forager—and managed to return to Lakedaimon ahead of the Thebans in time to prepare its defenses. Agesilaos’ son Arkhidamos was conspicuous in his bravery and repelled a Theban attack inside the city, which proudly lacked defensive walls and fortifications. However, Arkhidamos—leading “not even a hundred men”—pursued too far and was driven back with losses. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.9–13)
As related by Plutarch (ca. 45–125 CE), Epameinondas set out at night and actually managed to parallaxas (pass by) Agesilaos in his dash towards Lakedaimon (Sparta). However, Plutarch wrote that, according to the historian Kallisthenes (floruit mid-Fourth Century BCE), Agesilaos was apprised of the Theban advance by Euthynos of Thespiai. The Boiotian city of Thespiai had been destroyed by the Thebans prior to the autumn of 371 BCE, so Euthynos may have been a Thespiean exile serving in the Lakedaimonian army. Plutarch, who was well read, also mentioned Xenophon’s assertion that Agesilaos had been forwarned by a Kretan. Of course, Agesilaos likely received multiple reports of enemy movements. In any event, Agesilaos was able to give advance warning to the city by a horseman and shortly thereafter Agesilaos himself returned to the city ahead of the Theban river crossing. Both Agesilaos and his son Arkhidamos then vigorously defended the unwalled city and repelled the Theban allied army. (Plutarch. Agesilaos 34.3–8)
Some of the Theban cavalry may have in fact appeared on the opposite bank of the Eurotas River ahead of the returning Lakedaimonians (Spartans) only to find the bridge already defended thanks to Agesilaos’ warning. The Theban allied army may then have forded the Eurotas River opposite the town of Amyklai—a few kilometres south of the bridge at Lakedaimon—as they had during the invasion of the winter of 370/369 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 6.5.27, 6.5.30). The arrival of the Theban infantry vanguard behind their cavalry, a march of several kilometres downriver to a point opposite Amyklai, the fording of the Eurotas River, and a march of several kilometres back upriver would have given Agesilaos sufficient time to complete his short journey from Pellana. Thus the accounts of Xenophon and Plutarch would have been in basic agreement.[2]
Meanwhile, the Athenian cavalry set out from Eleusis and took a meal at the Isthmos in the vicinity of Korinth. Xenophon cryptically stated that some dystykhēma (ill luck, misfortune) befell the Athenian horsemen at Korinth. Perhaps, the Athenian cavalry had engaged in pillaging to obtain provisions for their meal and had been attacked by the irate Korinthians. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.15–16)
This unexplained ‘misfortune’ may have been linked to a falling out between the Athenians and Korinthians four years earlier in ca. 366 BCE. At that time, the Korinthians had feared that the Athenians were planning on garrisoning Korinth without consulting the Korinthians! This suspicion had led the Korinthians—who were allies of the Lakedaimonians (Spartans)—to expel their Athenian confederates and to make peace—but not an alliance—with Thebes. Other Lakedaimonian allies including the Phleiasians had also joined the Korinthians in making peace with the Thebans. Consequently, Korinth and these other states were evidently neutral during the current conflict. The Korinthian alliance with Lakedaimon was a defensive accord and—so far as the Korinthians knew—the home territory of the Lakedaimonians was not threatened at this time. As a result, Korinth’s peace treaty with the Thebans remained in effect. In any event, there may still have been ill feelings between the Athenians and Korinthians over the events of ca. 366 BCE. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.4.4–10) [3]
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| Phase Three Manoeuvres According to Xenophon. Blue = Thebans and allies. Pink = Lakedaimonians and allies. |
PHASE FOUR MANOEUVRES
Xenophon presented this failed Theban attack on Lakedaimon (Sparta) as a phenomenal Lakedaimonian victory against overwhelming odds. He also reported that Epameinondas was worried about the arrival of the army from Mantinea and noted that Epameinondas had “no desire to fight all of the Lakedaimonians together [with their allies from Mantinea]”. Having failed to surprise Lakedaimon (Sparta), a foiled Epameinondas did not tarry, but rapidly marched back north into Arkadia. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.14)
Xenophon’s account obscured the fact that Agesilaos and Arkhidamos had been deftly outmanoeuvred by Epameinondas! The wily Theban had succeeded in pinning Lakedaimon’s two most experienced and talented commanders in Sparta while he himself adroitly returned to Arkadia to engage the Lakedaimonian allied army at Mantinea! Epameinondas also prevented the Lakedaimonians from reinforcing their hoplites at Mantinea, where—as already mentioned—only three of the twelve Lakedaimonian lokhoi (companies) of hoplites were serving! A great general would, of course, have had “no desire” to allow his opponents to join their forces together! And a truly great general such as Epameinondas would ensure that they didn’t!
Arriving back at Tegea in southeast Arkadia, Epameinondas briefly rested his hoplites while immediately sending his cavalry on ahead to Mantinea in hopes of catching the Mantinean livestock and farmers outside the city walls as it was harvest time. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.14)
In the meanwhile, having arrived in Mantinea from the Isthmos via Kleonai, some of the Athenian cavalry were in the process of being quartered within houses inside Mantinea’s walls while others were still approaching the city when the Theban cavalry was spotted riding toward Mantinea. According to Polybios (9.8.11), the Athenians and Thebans caught sight of each other at midday as the Theban prōtoporeia (vanguard) reached the temple of Poseidon [Hippios] seven stadia (roughly 1.3 kilometres) from the city. The Mantineans begged the Athenians for help as their livestock and workmen were indeed still outside as well as many children and the elderly of the free populace. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.15)
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| Phase Four Manoeuvres According to Xenophon. Blue = Thebans and allies. Pink = Lakedaimonians and allies. |
THE CAVALRY SKIRMISH PRIOR TO THE BATTLE
According to Xenophon, the battle of Mantinea consisted of two separate engagements. First, there was a cavalry skirmish outside the walls of Mantinea between the Athenian cavalry versus the Theban and Thessalian horsemen. Secondly, the actual battle took place a day or so later between the full forces of both sides. Most other ancient writers conflate these two engagements into a single battle. The contemporary Xenophon was surely in a position to have known the correct details of this campaign in which his two sons took part.[4]
THE HIPPOMAKHIA (CAVALRY BATTLE)
Upon hearing the pleas of the Mantineans, the Athenian cavalry immediately sallied forth even though neither they nor their horses had been fed. It should be pointed out that Xenophon failed to give credit to the Theban allied cavalry, who had participated in the night-time dash to Lakedaimon (Sparta), the subsequent rapid march back to Tegea, and then the dash on to Mantinea. They and their mounts must have been exhausted and like the Athenian cavalry they were also possibly unfed. In any event, the Athenian cavalry swiftly dashed out against their opponents even though the Athenians saw that they were much more numerous and that they were Thebans and Thessalians, who had a reputation as the very best cavalry. By their bravery, the Athenian cavalry saved all of the Mantineans outside the city walls! Xenophon noted that the Athenians did not abandon the bodies of their friends and gave back the enemy dead under a truce. These were the actions of victors and indicated that the Theban allied cavalry had conceded defeat. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.15–17)
Plutarch (ca. 45–125 CE) did not give a full report of the campaign or battle, but briefly presented this cavalry skirmish as a preliminary engagement in which the Athenians arrived at the last minute and saved Mantinea from the hands of Epameinondas. He described a “violent hippomakhia (cavalry battle) under the gates and walls” of Mantinea. (Plutarch. Whether the Athenians are More Honoured for War or for Wisdom 2)
Xenophon did not mention why the other Lakedaimonian (Spartan) allied cavalry failed to help the Athenians. Perhaps they were too unprepared to deal with the sudden appearance of the Thebans and Thessalians. In addition, this cavalry skirmish was likely brief as the Theban allied cavalry were undoubtedly exhausted and had expected to encounter only livestock and farmers.
Xenophon made a very curious comment about this cavalry skirmish. He stated that the Athenians “passionately desired to recover their ancestral honour”! It is not at all clear to what event or events Xenophon was referring. Had the Athenians behaved dishonourablely during their recent dystykhēma (ill luck, misfortune) at Korinth? (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.16)
According to Plutarch, the battle of Mantinea was fought on the twelveth day of Skirophorion (an Athenian month roughly equivalent to June/July). However, Plutarch was clearly referring to this cavalry skirmish as he described the contest as a victory won by the Athenians “monoi (on their own) … over their victorious opponents”! Normally such a statement would be considered strangely contradictory, but in this case it makes sense as the Athenian cavalry defeated the Theban allied cavalry in this skirmish and then later the Thebans were victorious in the main battle! Plutarch’s date is in agreement with Xenophon’s statement that it was harvest time. The wheat harvest in the Peloponnesos was apparently in June/July. (Plutarch. Whether the Athenians are More Honoured for War or for Wisdom 7)
THE DEATH OF XENOPHON’S SON GRYLLOS
The two sons of Xenophon—Gryllos and Diodoros—fought in the Athenian contingent at Mantinea as Lakedaimonian (Spartan) allies. Gryllos, a member of the Athenian cavalry, was killed in the fighting. (Diogenes Laertios 2.6.53–54)
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| Part of Block VI, West Frieze, Parthenon Athens, Greece, ca. 438 BCE. (Acropolis Museum, Athens, Greece) An Athenian cavalryman wearing an Attic helmet and a linen cuirass with pteryges (flaps). |
Xenophon was discreet and professional in his reporting of this matter and did not mention his sons in his account. However, he did lavish praise upon the performance of the victorious Athenian cavalry in this skirmish outside the walls of Mantinea. No doubt writing as a proud, loving father, Xenophon asked “Who would not marvel at the aretē (excellence, courage, manliness) of these men?”, “good, brave men slain”. Xenophon also melodramatically tugged at his readers’ heartstrings by writing that the Athenian cavalry rescued children and elderly citizens from the dastardly Thebans! Based on Xenophon’s over-the-top praise of the Athenians in the cavalry skirmish, it seems pretty obvious that his son Gryllos was slain in this engagement that saved the Mantineans who were caught outside the city walls prior to the actual battle. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.15–17)
Pausanias the periēgētēs (ca. 115–180 CE) wrote about 500 years after the battle of Mantinea. He was not a historian. Instead, Pausanias was a very knowledgeable periēgētēs, a guide or author of geographical descriptions, who was generally very reliable when reporting what he personally saw. Pausanias saw a stele of a horseman in Mantinea “ou porrō (not too far) from a theatre” that the Mantineans had dedicated to Gryllos “entha epesen (where he fell)”. Today there are remains of a Fourth Century BCE theatre in the centre of the ruins of Mantinea. Both Xenophon and Plutarch described this cavalry battle as having taken place outside the city walls, so there is a problem with Pausanias’ account. Perhaps in Pausanias’ day there was another theatre outside the walls of Mantinea. Or perhaps Pausanias’ words “ou porrō (not too far) from a theatre” are not very precise. Or perhaps the stele was not placed where Gryllos actually fell. Perhaps a wounded Gryllos was carried inside the city by his Mantinean allies and died near the Fourth Century BCE theatre. In any event, it is clear that Gryllos must have fallen somewhere near the city where the cavalry skirmish had taken place and not on the battlefield, which was roughly 5.5 kilometres south of Mantinea. (Pausanias. 8.9.5, 8.11.6)
The Mantineans considered that Xenophon’s son Gryllos had been the bravest of those who fought on their side in this battle. The Athenian hipparch (cavalry commander) Kephisodoros was considered to have been the second bravest and was also slain in the fighting. Diogenes Laertios (2.54) concurred that Kephisodoros was the name of the Athenian hipparch at Mantinea. (Pausanias. 8.9.10)
Both Plutarch and Pausanias the periēgētēs referred to a painting of this hippomakhia (cavalry battle) by Euphranor of Athens. Plutarch described Euphranor’s portrayal of the battle as “ouk anenthousiastōs (not unimpassioned)”, which in ancient Greek is actually an emphatic compliment. Pausanias saw Euphranor’s painting in the Kerameikos (Potter’s Quarter) in Athens and also a copy in Mantinea. Pausanias wrote that the painting depicted Gryllos, the son of Xenophon, amongst the Athenians as well as Epameinondas serving in the Boiotian cavalry. Pausanias was a good reporter in the sense that he reported what the locals told him, but he rarely made a comment indicating whether or not he believed them. In this case, the identification of Gryllos and Epameinondas was likely an overly creative interpretation made up by local exēgētai (tourist guides) in order to glorify their fellow citizens and to impress tourists.[5] It is worth noting that Plutarch did not give names to any of the persons depicted in the painting. (Plutarch. Whether the Athenians are More Honoured for War or for Wisdom 2; Pausanias. 1.3.4, 8.9.8)
GO TO PART THREE
FOOTNOTES
[1]↩ According to Diodoros (15.59.1), Lykomedes of Tegea [sic] had persuaded the Arkadians to form the Arkadian League. Pausanias the periēgētēs (8.27.2) listed Lykomedes of Mantinea as one of the oikistai (founders) of Megalopolis, the new ‘capital’ of the Arkadian League. Lykomedes of Mantinea had led a unit of 5,000 Arkadians known as the epilektoi (chosen) just before and just after the Theban allied invasion of Lakonike during the winter of 370/369 BCE (Diodoros 15.62.2, 15.67.2). So, Lykomedes had likely commanded the Arkadian contingent during the invasion itself. Typical of his selective reporting, Xenophon (Hellēnika 7.1.23–24, 7.1.39, 7.4.2–3) only mentioned Lykomedes of Mantinea when he quarrelled with the Thebans and when he was assassinated abroad a few years prior to the battle of Mantinea! In any event, it was likely the death of Lykomedes that resulted in the rise to power of a Mantinean faction that was less devoted to the Arkadian League than Lykomedes had been.
[2]↩ Polyainos (2.3.10) wrote that Epameinondas made a night attack upon an empty Lakedaimon (Sparta), but that Agesilaos was alerted by automoloi (persons who were AWOL or deserters) and as a result arrived back ahead of the Thebans and repelled their attack upon the city.
Frontinus (3.11.5) reported that Epameinondas was “a transfuga proditus (betrayed by a deserter)” and as a result actually abandoned his march against Sparta!
[3]↩ This state of affairs in ca. 366 BCE apparently led to the seizure of power by the tyrant Timophanes, who had been placed in command of a troop of mercenaries ironically hired to defend the independence of Korinth. In ca. 364 BCE, Timophanes was assassinated at the instigation of his brother Timoleon, who detested tyrants. In 344 BCE with “skhedon (roughly) twenty years having elapsed”, Timoleon of Korinth would justly rise to fame as the liberator of Syracuse (a Korinthian colony) and indeed of all of the Greek cities of Sicily! Xenophon did not mention either Timophanes or Timoleon, who did not become famous until approximately a decade after Xenophon’s death. However, Xenophon (Hellēnika 7.4.6) did mention the mercenary infantry and cavalry that the Korinthians hired following their expulsion of their Athenian allies. (Plutarch. Timoleon)
[4]↩ The brief summary of this campaign as given by the respected historian Polybios of Megalopolis (ca. before 199 to 120 BCE) surprisingly makes little sense! Polybios reported that Epameninondas was at Tegea and the Lakedaimonians with their full force along with their allies were mustered together at Mantinea. After nightfall, Epameinondas led his army against Lakedaimon (Sparta) and reached the deserted city at the third hour. Strangely Epameinondas failed to take the city. An automolos (person who was AWOL or a deserter) warned Agesilaos in Mantinea and the Lakedaimonian allied army miraculously arrived in Sparta in the nick of time to save the city! The automolos would presumably have had to travel the approximately 17 kilometres from Tegea to Mantinea to warn Agesilaos and then Agesilaos would have had to march those same 17 kilometres—about half a day’s march for infantry—before even arriving at Epameinondas’ starting point. How Agesilaos could have managed to arrive in time in Lakedaimon is beyond belief. In any event, Epameinondas then led his army back into Arkadia hoping to capture Mantinea bereft of defenders. However, the Athenians arrived just in time to save Mantinea from the Thebans! Polybios did not describe the return march of the Lakedaimonian allied army nor the battle itself! (Polybios. 9.8)
[5]↩ Pausanias (8.11.6) further claimed that, in accordance with both the Athenian and Theban accounts, the painting depicted Gryllos wounding Epameinondas. In another passage, Pausanias (9.15.5) asserted that the painting of the cavalry battle depicted Gryllos, the son of Xenophon, slaying Epameinondas! There actually isn’t any difference between these two versions as according to most accounts Epameinondas was mortally wounded and carried from the battlefield still alive. Needless to say, all indications are that Gryllos died in the cavalry skirmish outside the walls of Mantinea whereas Epameinondas died a day or two later in the battle south of Mantinea! So much for the tall tales told by local exēgētai (tourist guides)!
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