All text, translations, and maps copyrighted by Lawrence Douglas Ringer. Last modified on: 11-November-2016.
If you encounter a word or spelling with which you are unfamiliar, be sure to check the glossaries (see the links on the right under Reference Aids).
According to Pausanias the periēgētēs (8.11.5), the battle took place “hōs (about, nearly) 30 stadia (roughly 5.5 kilometres)” south of Mantinea.[6] This would place the battlefield at the narrowest part of the plain in what is known today as the Mytika Gap. This gap is over two kilometres wide, which would be sufficient for the deployment of the armies involved. It would also be an excellent location to protect the flanks of a smaller army. (William Kendrick Pritchett. Studies in Ancient Greek Topography Part II (Battlefields). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pages 63–66)
Plutach related that the main battle near Mantinea was fought “oligais de hysteron hēmerais (a few days after)” the failed Theban assault on the city of Lakedaimon (Sparta). The cavalry skirmish would have taken place between those two events. Probably a day or so after the cavalry skirmish, Epameinondas and his infantry joined up with their cavalry and together they confronted the Lakedaimonian (Spartan) allied army at Mantinea. (Plutarch. Agesilaos 35)
THE THEBAN ALLIED ARMY AT MANTINEA
As mentioned above, the Theban allied army consisted of all of the Boiotians, the Euboians, and polys (many) of the Thessalians both from the Thessalian League and from the tyrant Alexander of Pherai. Diodoros included Akhaians [from Phthiotis?], Malians and Ainianes, who were all Thessalian subject-allies. Their Peloponnesian allies included the Argives, Messenians, and some of the Arkadians including the Tegeatans, Megalopolitans, Aseateans, Pallanteans, and other cities that, according to Xenophon, were “ēnankazonto (forced)” to serve in the Theban army. Diodoros described the Arkadians in the Theban allied army as the most numerous and the mightiest of the Arkadians. Diodoros also included the Lokrians and Sikyonians in the Theban army. The Theban totals, according to Diodoros, were “hyper (over) 30,000 infantry and ouk elattous (not less than) 3,000 cavalry”. These numbers are certainly questionable and more than likely did not include psiloi (light infantry), who are rarely enumerated by ancient writers. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.4-5; Diodoros 15.84.4, 15.85.2)
The following are guesstimates of the size of individual infantry contingents in the Theban allied army totalling “over 30,000 infantry”:
The following are guesstimates of the size of individual cavalry contingents in the Theban allied army totalling “not less than 3,000 cavalry”:
THE LAKEDAIMONIAN ALLIED ARMY AT MANTINEA
At the same time that Epameinondas and his infantry had arrived in the vicinity of Mantinea from the south, the Athenian infantry had also arrived at Mantinea from the northeast. Diodoros (15.84.2) wrote that the Athenians numbered 6,000 men and were commanded by Hegesileos. Diogenes Laertios (2.54) concurred that Hegesileos was the Athenian commander. This reinforcement of 6,000 Athenians swelled the Lakedaimonian allied ranks from roughly 14,000 to a respectable 20,000 hoplites with which the Lakedaimonian allies felt confident in opposing the larger Theban allied army. However, they apparently choose the narrow Mytika Gap as the battlefield to avoid being outflanked on both wings.
Neither Xenophon nor any other ancient author mentioned who was in command of the Lakedaimonians at the battle of Mantinea, but it may have been the obscure Agiad king Kleomenes II (reigned 370–309/308 BCE), the son of King Kleombrotos I (reigned 380–371 BCE) and the younger brother of King Agesipolis II (reigned 371–370 BCE).[23]
The Lakedaimonian (Spartan) allied army included Akhaians from the Peloponnesos, Eleians, Athenians, Mantineans, and some other unnamed Arkadians. As for the Lakedaimonians themselves, all of their cavalry and mercenaries were present, but they had been prevented by Epameinondas from reinforcing their army at Mantinea with additional Lakedaimonian hoplites. As a result, only three of the twelve Lakedaimonian lokhoi (companies) of hoplites were present at the battle! This was a tremendous disadvantage for the Lakedaimonians as in the past their own hoplites had always been the strongest part of any Lakedaimonian allied army. According to Diodoros, the Lakedaimonian allied army numbered “pleious (more than) 20,000 infantry and peri (around) 2,000 horsemen”. Like the totals for the Theban allied army, these figures are problematic. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.1, 7.5.10, 7.5.18; Diodoros. 15.84.4))
The following are guesstimates of the size of individual infantry contingents in the Lakedaimonian allied army totalling “more than 20,000 infantry”:
Obviously, what is striking about the above totals is the high proportion of Athenians and the minuscule number of Lakedaimonians (Spartans)!
The following are guesstimates of the size of individual cavalry contingents in the Lakedaimonian allied army totalling “around 2,000 cavalry”:
MERCENARIES AT THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA
At this point in Greek history, virtually every Greek state employed mercenaries. A few examples should suffice to illustrate this point. When the two Arkadian cities of Orkhomenos and Kleitor were at war with each other in ca. 378 BCE, the Kleitorians maintained a force of mercenaries, which was appropriated by the Lakedaimonian (Spartan) king Agesilaos (Xenophon. Hellēnika 5.4.36–37). The following year (ca. 377 BCE), mercenary peltasts were mentioned serving in the Theban army (Xenophon. Hellēnika 5.4.54). At the battle of Leuktra in 371 BCE, there was a unit in the Lakedaimonian army called Hieron’s mercenaries (Xenophon. Hellēnika 6.4.9). In ca. 366 BCE, the Sikyonian tyrant Euphron joined in a Theban attack on Phleious with the Sikyonians themselves and his personal corps of “peri (about) 2,000 mercenaries” (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.2.11). As for the Athenians, over the course of several decades we know of mercenary units led by Iphikrates, Khabrias, and Khares (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.4.9, 7.1.25, 7.2.20–21).
The only mercenaries mentioned by Xenophon as serving in the battle of Mantinea were mercenaries hired by the Lakedaimonians. However, there were undoubtedly many other mercenaries serving on both sides.
WAS THE LAKEDAIMONIAN KING AGESILAOS PRESENT AT THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA?
Once the Thebans had placed themselves between Lakedaimon (Sparta) and Mantinea, it surely would have been suicidal for the remaining nine Lakedaimonian lokhoi (companies)—which were in Lakedaimon and likely numbered fewer than 1,800 hoplites—to have set out from Sparta without the support of either cavalry or numerous, competent light infantry. Their challenge would have been to sneak past the Theban army of over 33,000 men and join the allied army at Mantinea, which was some 60 kilometres away as the bird flies! There were several routes and passes that the Lakedaimonian army could have taken, but the Theban allied army would only have needed to await their emergence into the Tegeatan plain. There this tiny Lakedaimonian relief force would surely have been overwhelmed by the numerous hoplites, cavalry, and excellent light infantry of the Theban allied army! Such a foolhardy march would no doubt have made the hellish mauling of the 600 Lakedaimonian (Spartan) hoplites near Lekhaion by Iphikrates in 391/390 BCE seem like a pleasant Lakedaimonian stroll through the countryside!
In addition, Agesilaos was certainly shrewd enough to know that he did not want to place the bulk of the tiny Lakedaimonian army in Mantinea with the much larger Theban allied army between it and the virtually defenseless city of Lakedaimon (Sparta)! Xenophon (Hellēnika 7.5.10) wrote that, if Agesilaos and his troops had not earlier returned in time, Epameinondas ”would have siezed the city like a nest of young birds altogether devoid of defenders”! This possibility was still a real threat even after Epameinondas withdrew. He could always return especially if he learned that Agesilaos was in Mantinea and that Lakedaimon was once again devoid of defenders! It must be remembered that Lakedaimon was unwalled, so it needed a sizeable force of competent warriors to defend it. An unwalled city could not be reliably defended by poorly armed and organized boys, old men, and women. That at any rate was Xenophon’s first hand opinion of the matter.
It should be noted that Xenophon did not record that his hero Agesilaos made such a bold attempt to reach Mantinea once the Thebans had withdrawn from Lakedaimon (Sparta). If King Agesilaos and the remaining nine Lakedaimonian lokhoi had indeed marched out from Lakedaimon following Epameinondas’ withdrawal and had successfully snuck into Mantinea ahead of Epameinondas, surely Xenophon would have lavished a huge amount of praise upon his favourite Lakedaimonian for such an amazing march that had outmanoeuvred Epameinondas! It should also be noted that neither Xenophon nor any other ancient author claimed that Agesilaos was present at the battle near Mantinea![35] I am therefore at a loss to understand why many modern authors place Agesilaos at the battle.
According to Xenophon, the battle of Mantinea was virtually over before it even began! The brilliant Epameinondas drew up his army for battle; but, rather than advancing directly against the enemy, he marched westwardly towards the mountains and successfully hoodwinked his opponents into believing that he was manoeuvring his army to encamp. He was not! (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.20–22)
Evidently, the Lakedaimonian allied army was positioned across the Mytika Gap at the narrowest part of the plain in order to protect their flanks from being turned by the larger Theban allied army. It seems that Epameinondas approached from his camp at Tegea and drew up his army in battle order. The Thebans may have offered battle at midday or later, but when their opponents refused to advance beyond their defensive position, Epameinondas pretended to be encamping for the night.
Once the Theban left wing reached the mountain, they grounded arms. Foolishly, their opponents relaxed their readiness for battle. Epameinondas was stationed on this wing and strengthened it with additional arriving companies. He then led the advance against his ill prepared opponents “antiprōron hōsper triērē (prow on like a trireme)”. According to Arrian (The Tactical Art 11.2) this attack included all of the Boiotians not just the Thebans in an embolos (ram) formation. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.22–23)
Epameinondas’ cavalry—apparently the Boiotian cavalry on the left wing—were drawn up in a strong embolos (ram or wedge) mixed with hamippoi (infantry runners). The enemy cavalry, on the other hand, were drawn up like a phalanx—in other words in a rectangular formation—and without hamippoi. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.23–24)
The weaker Theban right wing was held back. Opposite them, the Athenians were posted on the left wing of the Lakedaimonian allied army. Epameinondas placed cavalry and hoplites on some hills over against them. These troops threatened to attack the Athenians in the rear if they moved to aid their own right wing. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.23–24)
By holding back his right wing, Epameinondas apparently forced his opponents either to move their left wing out from the protection of the Mytika Gap or to keep the strong Athenian contingent unengaged in the battle.
According to Diodoros, the Mantineans and other Arkadians occupied the right wing followed by the Lakedaimonians, Eleians, and Akhaians. Diodoros agreed with Xenophon that the Athenians held the left wing. On the other side, the Thebans held their own left wing supported by their Arkadian allies; the Argives held the right wing. Both sides placed cavalry on each wing. In a confused description, Diodoros claimed that the Euboians and mercenaries were posted on some hills. These may have been the cavalry and hoplites mentioned by Xenophon on the hills on the Theban right. (Diodoros. 15.85.2–6, 15.87.3)
The Theban allied army quickly routed all of the enemy army including both their phalanx and their cavalry. However, before the Thebans and their allies could engage in a lengthy pursuit and massacre of their fleeing oponnents, Epameinondas was slain. The pursuit abruptly ceased. However, hamippoi and peltasts on the Theban right wing advanced unsupported and most were supposedly killed by the Athenians. Xenophon did not explain why the Theban allied cavalry and hoplites—whom he had mentioned as being stationed on this wing—did not prevent this slaughter! (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.24–25)
Both armies set up battle trophies and gave back some of the enemy dead under a truce as if victorious. Both sides also received back some of their own dead under a truce as if defeated. Xenophon observed that there was more confusion in Greece after the battle than there had been before the battle. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.26–27)
Unfortunately, the above is all that can be reliably related concerning the course of the battle!
The Siceliote (Sicilian Greek) Diodoros of Agyrion (floruit ca. 60–30 BCE)—also known by his Latinized name Diodorus Siculus—presented the most detailed account of the battle. Modern scholars almost universally believe that Diodoros’ account was derived from the history of Ephoros of Kyme (floruit 4th Century BCE). The highly respected ancient Greek historian Polybios of Megalopolis (12.25f.3) dismissed Ephoros’ account of the battle of Mantinea as geloios (laughable, ludicrous)! Diodoros’ account—whether derived from Ephoros or not—would certainly qualify as geloios!
In his appraisal of Diodoros’ account of the battle of Mantinea, W. K. Pritchett concludes:
THE DEATH OF EPAMEINONDAS
Xenophon just barely even mentioned the death of Epameinondas simply writing “when at any rate this person fell”! Uncharacteristically, Xenophon had high praise for Epameinondas’ performance during this campaign writing that “indeed so far as acts of foresight and courage, the man seems to me to have left not one undone”. Xenophon added that “to have prepared the army so that none flinched from toil neither by night nor by day, not one withdrew from danger and although their supplies were scanty nevertheless they gladly obeyed. This to me seems to be admirable.” Apparently, all Epameinondas needed to do to be noticed and even receive a compliment from Xenophon was to get himself killed! (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.8, 7.5.19, 7.5.25)
Later writers expanded on the topic of Epameinondas’ death, but regrettably their accounts were coloured by melodrama and legend.
The account of the death of Epameinondas as given by Diodoros is the most melodramic. Diodoros wrote that Epameinondas wounded the Lakedaimonian commander and then was targeted by the Lakedaimonians, was swarmed, and was struck in the chest with a doru (spear). Epameinondas was then carried back out of the fray, was told of the Boiotian victory, and finally directed that the spear point be withdrawn resulting in his death. It is a scene worthy of the worst television melodrama or a dreadful Frank Miller pseudo-historical blockbuster. (Diodoros. 15.86.4–5, 15.87.1, 15.87.5–6)
The brief account of the Roman biographer Cornelius Nepos (floruit 1st Century BCE) is very similar. Epameinondas fought boldly, but was recognized by the Lakedaimonians and swarmed. He fell pierced by a thrown sparus (small spear with a barbed head). The Boiotians then overwhelmed their enemies and, when Epameinondas heard that news, he drew out the spear head and died. (Cornelius Nepos. Epaminondas 15.9)
Pausanias the periēgētēs wrote that, according to the Athenians and Thebans, Epameinondas was slain by Gryllos, the son of Xenophon! However, according to the Mantineans, he was slain by Makhairion of Mantinea and, according to the Lakedaimonians, Makhairion the Spartiate slew Epameinondas! Pausanias pointed out that the Mantineans honoured Gryllos with a public funeral and set up a stele where he fell whereas there were no monuments to an individual named Makhairion in either Mantinea or Sparta. However, as detailed above, Gryllos was apparently slain a day or two before the death of Epameinondas! In addition, Gryllos was buried near the walls of Mantinea whereas Epameinondas was buried roughly 5.5 kilometres away at the Mytika Gap. Both men were said to have been buried where they fell. Clearly none of Pausanias’ local legends concerning who killed Epameinondas can be considered reliable. (Pausanias. 8.11.5–6, 9.15.5, 8.9.5)
Pausanias also related that Epameinondas was carried alive from the battle. The point from which he watched the battle and died was called Skope (‘Lookout’). Epameinondas was buried at the spot where the two armies had met. On his grave stood a kiōn (columnar gravestone or pillar) with a shield with a drakōn (dragon) emblem denoting the Spartoi (‘Sown-men’, the Thebans who sprang from the dragon’s teeth sown in legend by Kadmos). There were also two inscribed steles, one with an old Boiotian inscription and another inscribed by the Emperor Hadrian. Regrettably, Pausanias did not record what either inscription said! (Pausanias. 8.11.7–8, 8.12.1)
Plutarch (ca. 45–125 CE) and Claudius Aelianus (ca. 165/170–222/238 CE) both related the questionable anecdote that Epameinondas received a mortal wound at Mantinea and was brought alive to a tent. There he called for Daiphantos and for Iolaidas each in turn to make them general, but was told that both men were already dead. Incidentally, neither man is otherwise known. Anyway, Epameinondas then supposedly advised the Thebans to make peace as they no longer had a general! (Plutarch. Sayings of Kings and Commanders 194.24; Aelian. Varia Historia 12.3)
Plutarch presented the most credible version of the death of Epameinondas. Plutarch stated that, according to the polyhistor Dioskourides (floruit Fourth–Third Centuries BCE), Epameinondas was slain by a Lakonian named Antikrates with a doru (spear). In Plutarch’s own day, the Lakedaimonians honoured Antikrates for slaying Epameinondas and granted tax exemption to his descendants. However, Plutarch noted that his descendants were known to the Lakedaimonians as the Makhairiones or ‘Swordsmen’ as Antikrates was said to have struck the fatal blow with a makhaira (sword) not a doru (spear) as Dioskourides contended. This explains the no doubt mistaken personal name Makhairion from Pausanias’ unreliable local sources. Plutarch submitted strong support for his story by relating that one of Antikrates’ descendants named Kallikrates enjoyed tax exemption even in Plutarch’s own time. (Plutarch. Agesilaos 35)
Along with the death in Thessaly of the illustrious and beloved Theban leader Pelopidas two years earlier in 364 BCE, the death of Epameinondas at the battle of Mantinea in 362 BCE meant the end of the brief era of Theban pre-eminence. Though Thebes would remain a major Greek power, Thebes would never again be the hegemon of a large coalition of allied states.
Athens was evidentally little effected by the battle. Subsequently, Athens continued to treat its maritime allies in an increasingly heavy handed, imperial fashion. Five years after the battle of Mantinea, the so-called Second Athenian Confederacy (founded in ca. 378 BCE) effectively came to an end as a result of the successful revolts of Khios, Rhodes, Kos, and Byzantion. Athens remained a major Greek power following this revolt of its allies, called the Social War (357–355 BCE) by modern scholars. However, as war against the rising power of Makedon loomed, Athens like Thebes no longer led a large coalition of allied states.
The battle was far more momentous for the Lakedaimonians (Spartans) as it marked the end of Lakedaimon as a major Greek power. Never again would Lakedaimonian armies operate effectively outside of the Peloponnesos and their influence within the Peloponnesos was for the most part no greater than that of any other state.[36] A few years later, the Lakedaimonian king Agesilaos II (reigned ca. 401/400–360/359 BCE) drew his last breath at the age of 84 on the coast of Libya. Agesilaos had been returning home following his service as a mercenary commander in the employ of squabbling Egyptian rebels. Roughly 21 years later, his son Arkhidamos III (reigned 360/359–338 BCE) died in a minor war in southern Italy as a mercenary captain fighting the barbarian Lucanians in 338 BCE. This was the same year that the Thebans and Athenians put aside their differences and jointly led the unsuccessful opposition to the Makedonians at Khaironeia.
THE MAKEDONIAN CONQUEST OF GREECE
Twenty-four years after the battle of Mantinea, the Makedonian king Philip II (reigned 359–336 BCE)—the founder of Makedonia as a major power—decisively defeated a coalition of Greek states led by the Thebans and Athenians at the battle of Khaironeia in Boiotia in 338 BCE. Almost all of the Greeks of the mainland were subsequently enrolled in the new, so-called League of Korinth. This coalition of Greek states was formed by Philip to participate in a Makedonian led crusade against the Persian Empire. Lakedaimon (Sparta) was considered of so little importance that neither Philip nor his son Alexander the Great (reigned 336–323 BCE) wasted their time to force the Lakedaimonians to join this alliance.
Before Philip could lead this crusade against Persia, he was assassinated in 336 BCE. Philip’s death resulted in the rebellion of many Makedonian subjects including both Athens and Thebes. Philip’s young son and successor Alexander besieged and captured Thebes in 335 BCE. As an example to other rebels, Alexander sold the population into slavery and raised the city of Thebes to the ground. In addition to its historical fame, Thebes had been the mythological home of Kadmos, Dionysos, Herakles and Oidipous (Oedipus) as well as the site of the legendary wars known as the ‘Seven against Thebes’ and the Epigonoi (‘Offspring’ aka ‘Sons of the Seven against Thebes’). Only the temples and the house of the great Boiotian poet Pindar (518–438 BCE) were left standing in Thebes. Alexander’s barbarity against this renowned, major Greek city was shocking, but it had the desired effect. Athens and the other Greeks promptly submitted without further fighting. The following year, Alexander was free to lead the invasion of the mighty Persian Empire. (Arrian. Anabasis 1.7–9; Diodoros. 17.8–15; Plutarch. Alexander 11.4–6)
Following his first victory over the Persians at the Granikos River in Hellespontine Phrygia in 334 BCE, Alexander the Great sent 300 Persian panoplies from the spoils to Athens and ordered their dedication to be inscribed “Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks except for the Lakedaimonians [took these] from the barbarians dwelling in Asia” (Arrian. Anabasis 1.16.7 – my emphasis). The Lakedaimonians (Spartans) had been the heroes of the Persian War of 480–479 BCE. In 334 BCE, Alexander wished to emphasize their conspicuous absence from his Panhellenic crusade against the Persians.
In fact, rather than fight against the Persians, the Lakedaimonians (Spartans) accepted Persian money in 333 BCE, hired numerous mercenaries, and began hostilities in Greece against the Makedonians. The Persian king Dareios III (reigned 336-330 BCE) hoped that, by financing military operations to the rear of the young Makedonian king’s offensive, he could divert or delay Alexander, who was methodically advancing against him. However, Alexander was not deterred. Fortunately for Alexander, his general Antipater decisively defeated the Lakedaimonian king Agis III (reigned 338–331/330 BCE) and his army of Persian financed mercenaries at the battle of Megalopolis in Arkadia either in late 331 BCE or in early 330 BCE. Agis III, the son of Arkhidamos III, was slain in the battle. Thus the final Lakedaimonian (Spartan) undertaking during the Greek Classical Age (ca. 500–323 BCE) was sadly as Persian lackeys. This shameful Lakedaimonian (Spartan) effort on behalf of the Persians was too little and too late for the Lakedaimonians’ always questionable support for the liberty of other Greeks! (Arrian. Anabasis 2.13.4–6; Diodoros. 17.48.1–2, 17.62.6–17.63.4, 17.73.5–6; Curtius. 4.1.39–40, 6.1)
Alexander the Great defeated Dareios III at the battle of Gaugamela near Arbela (modern Erbil in northeast Iraq) on October 1st, 331 BCE. This historic battle was the death blow to the mighty kingdom of the Achaimenian Persians, who had ruled the largest empire in the world—up until that time—for roughly 220 years. Sometime afterwards, the 25 year old Alexander learned of the Lakedaimonian (Spartan) defeat at Megalopolis and was supposed to have commented in derision “It seems, men, that while we were here conquering Dareios, back in Arkadia there was a battle of mice!”. Such was the great Makedonian conqueror’s contempt for the Lakedaimonians (Spartans). (Plutarch. Agesilaos 15.4)
[6]↩ Pausanias (8.11.5) wrote that the Athenian and Mantinean cavalry fought the Boiotian horsemen at the Pelagos grove “hōs (about, nearly) 30 stadia” (roughly 5.5 kilometres) south of Mantinea. Pausanias implied that this was the engagement in which Epameinondas was slain. This is apparently a jumbled account of the main battle in which Epameinondas died according to Xenophon (Hellēnika 7.5.25).
[7]↩ During the Peloponnesian War, the Boiotians in 424 BCE fielded “malista (about) 7,000 hoplites, hyper (more than) 10,000 psiloi (light infantry), 1,000 cavalry, and 500 peltasts” at their victory over the Athenians at Delion (Thoukydides. 4.93). In ca. 395 BCE, the Boiotian League was divided into 11 districts each of which was required to contribute “peri (around) 1,000 hoplites and 100 cavalry” to a league army (Hellēnika Oxyrhynkhia. fragment 16.3-4). Thus, in theory, the customary size for a Boiotian League army was 11,000 hoplites and 1,100 horsemen. The Boiotians—without the Orkhomenians—had deployed “peri (around) 5,000” hoplites at the battle of Nemea in the Peloponnesos in 394 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17). During their wars against the Lakedaimonians, the Thebans had destroyed the Boiotian cities of Plataia (ca. 374/373 BCE), Thespiai (prior to autumn 371 BCE), and Orkhomenos (364 BCE) (An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis. Pages 447, 450–451, 457). Their lands may have been distributed to new citizens. Nonetheless, there may have been a subsequent reduction in the number of Boiotian troops. The Boiotians reportedly dispatched 7,000 infantry and 600 cavalry under Epameinondas in his second Peloponnesian campaign in ca. 369 BCE (Diodoros. 15.68.1). In ca. 368 BCE, the Thebans supposedly dispatched 8,000 hoplites and 600 cavalry in an expedition into Thessaly (Diodoros. 15.71.3). According to the relatively trustworthy report of Plutarch (Pelopidas 35.1), the Thebans sent 7,000 hoplites and 700 cavalry into Thessaly following the death of Pelopidas in 364 BCE.
[8]↩ At the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE, there were “ouk elattous (not less than) 3,000” hoplites “from all of Euboia” (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17). Most of the Euboians defected from the Athenians in 371 BCE and allied with Thebes. “Euboians from all of their cities” were part of the Theban allied army that invaded Lakonike during the winter of 370/369 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 6.5.23). Euboia was dominated by four major cities: Khalkis and Eretria in the centre, Histiaia/Oreos in the north, and Karystos in the south. Thanks to inscriptions from the late Fourth Century and early Third Century BCE, it is estimated that Eretria had 6,000 adult male citizens (An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis. Page 652). It appears that Khalkis was of a similar size whereas Histiaia/Oreos and Karystos were smaller.
[9]↩ The Ozolian Lokrians (i.e. the western Lokrians) had contributed psiloi (light infantry) at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17). Later in the same year, both (i.e. eastern and western) Lokrians fought against the Lakedaimonians at the battle of Koroneia (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.3.15). According to Xenophon (Hellēnika 6.5.23), both (i.e. eastern and western) Lokrians served in the Theban allied army in the invasion of Lakonike during the winter of 370/369 BCE. So the inclusion of Lokrians in the Theban allied army at Mantinea by Diodoros (15.85.2) is reasonable.
[10]↩ According to Xenophon (Hellēnika 6.1.19), the Thessalians under Jason of Pherai in ca. 374 BCE could field “ouk elattous (not less than) 20,000 hoplites” and numerous peltasts!
[11]↩ The Argives had marshalled a large force of “peri (around) 7,000” hoplites at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17)
[12]↩ The numbers and composition of the Messenian army are unknown. During the Peloponnesian War (ca. 431–404 BCE), Thoukydides several times mentioned Messenian hoplites serving with distinction alongside the Athenians. These few Messenians had been settled at Naupaktos in western Lokris by the Athenians following their 10 year long revolt against the Lakedaimonians. (Thoukydides. 1.103, 2.90, 2.102, 3.75, 3.107–108, 4.9)
[13]↩ At the battle of Thermoplylai in 480 BCE, the Arkadians had contributed 500 Tegeatan, 500 Mantinean, 120 Orkhomenian, and 1,000 other Arkadian hoplites (Herodotos. 7.202). This Arkadian force of 2,120 hoplites dwarfed the Spartiatai contribution of only 300 hoplites. Nonetheless, the Arkadians had fielded only 1,500 Tegeatan and 600 Orkhomenian hoplites as well as an equal number of psiloi (light infantry) at the battle of Plataia in 479 BCE (Herodotos. 9.28). The Arkadians could have supplied numerous hoplites at the battle of Mantinea in 362 BCE. The Arkadian League assembly was called the Myrioi or ‘Ten Thousand’ apparently indicating the number of hoplites in the league army. However, it is unclear which Arkadian states contributed troops to the Theban allied army. Xenophon only mentioned the Tegeatans, Megalopolitans, Aseateans, and Pallanteans by name.
[14]↩ According to Xenophon (Hellēnika 7.1.18, 7.1.22, 7.1.44–46, 7.2.11, et al), the Sikyonians had been Theban allies since 369 BCE, so their inclusion in this campaign by Diodoros is quite likely. Sikyon had contributed 3,000 hoplites to the Greek army at Plataia in 479 BCE (Herodotos 9.28–29). The Sikyonians mobilized 1,500 hoplites at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.16).
[15]↩ As mentioned above in note # 7, in theory, the customary size of the cavalry contingent for a full Boiotian League army was 1,100 horsemen. The Boiotian cavalry had numbered “eis (about) 800” at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17).
[16]↩ According to Xenophon (Hellēnika 6.1.19), the Thessalians and their allies under Jason of Pherai in ca. 374 BCE could field “pleious (more than) 8,000 cavalry including their allies”! The army of Alexander the Great that invaded the Persians Empire included a contingent of 1,800 Thessalian horsemen.
[17]↩ During the Greek Archaic Age (ca. 800–500 BCE), the two most important Euboian cities, Eretria and Khalkis, were both noted for their cavalry. The Euboians from Khalkis had fielded “eis (about) 100” cavalry at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17). Thanks to inscriptions from the late Fourth Century and early Third Century BCE, it is estimated that Eretria had a cavalry force of probably 500 (An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis. Page 654).
[18]↩ The Opountian Lokrians—either Lokrians from the city of Opous or from eastern Lokris as a whole—contributed “eis (about) 50” cavalry against the Lakedaimonians at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17). Lokrian cavalry served in the Theban allied army that invaded Lakonike in 370/369 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 6.5.30).
[19]↩ It is unclear whether or not the Argives fielded a cavalry contingent.
[20]↩ It is unclear whether or not the Messenians fielded a cavalry contingent.
[21]↩ It is unclear whether or not the Arkadians fielded a cavalry contingent.
[22]↩ It is unclear whether or not the Sikyonians fielded a cavalry contingent.
[23]↩ Diodoros (15.82–84) claimed that the Lakedaimonian king Agis (a non-existent individual) commanded the full Lakedaimonian army and was plundering the territory of Tegea when Epameinondas attacked Sparta. Agis warned Agesilaos, who had been left behind on guard, and shortly thereafter the Lakedaimonian army arrived to rescue the city. However, Diodoros does not record who later commanded at the battle of Mantinea. Polybios (9.8) related that Agesilaos commanded the full Lakedaimonian army at Mantinea and subsequently this army marched south to rescue Lakedaimon (Sparta) from Epameinondas. Polybios does not describe the Lakedaimonian army’s return march to Mantinea nor the battle itself.
[24]↩ The length of this footnote soon got out of control, so I moved it too its own separate blog page entitled Lakedaimonian Numbers.
Based on the conclusions in the linked blog page, it seems highly unlikely that a lokhos would have numbered more than 200 Lakedaimonian hoplites in 362 BCE. Therefore, the twelve lokhoi, which formed the Lakedaimonian army, may have numbered 2,400 men or fewer.
[25]↩ The Athenians had deployed “eis (about) 6,000 hoplites” at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17)
[26]↩ “Three thousand Eleian hoplites” arrived too late to fight in the battle of Mantinea in 418 BCE on the side of the Mantineans (Thoukydides. 5.75.5). The Eleians, Triphylians, Akrorians, and Lasionians had assembled a force of “engys (nearly) 3,000” hoplites fighting on the Lakedaimonian side at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE, but how many of that number were Eleians is unknown (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.16). The Eleians must have been able to field an army of at least 6,000 hoplites. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand how they ever controlled such a large, fertile homeland as Eleia and ruled such a large perioikic territory as Triphylia or how they ever hoped to successfully battle the Arkadians in 365–363 BCE.
[27]↩ Xenophon was extremely vague about which Arkadians opposed the Thebans. The only Arkadians on the Lakedaimonian side that he explicitly named were the Mantineans! Xenophon also wrote that the Eparitoi sent ambassadors seeking aid from the Lakedaimonians. However, he does not mention the Eparitoi in his description of the battle. Likewise, Diodoros (15.85.2) simply referred to the “Mantineans along with the other Arkadians” on the right wing of the Lakedaimonian army. It is therefore difficult to estimate the Arkadian numbers. My estimate of up to 5,000 Arkadians seems excessive to me, but it is possible given the ambiguity of our sources. According to the orator Lysias (34.7), the citizen population of Mantinea numbered “oude (not even) three thousand”. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.1, 7.5.3, 7.5.14–18)
[28]↩ The numbers and composition of the Akhaian army are unknown.
[29]↩ According to Xenophon (Hellēnika 7.1.27), “polys (many) mercenaries” had been hired by a Persian agent, Philiskos of Abydos, to aid the Lakedaimonians in 368 BCE. Diodoros (15.70.2) recorded that Philiskos hired “2,000 chosen mercenaries” to aid the Lakedaimonians. The number of mercenaries in Lakedaimonian service in 362 BCE was likely low as it is doubtful that they had access to Persian funds at this time.
[30]↩ The Lakedaimonians had fielded “peri (around) 700 cavalry of the Lakedaimonians” at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.16). Thirty-two years later, the entire Lakedaimonian cavalry force was likely no more than half that size.
[31]↩ The Athenian cavalry had numbered “eis (about) 600” at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17)
[32]↩ The Eleians maintained a small yet notable cavalry corps, which may have been called the Four Hundred. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.4.13–14, 7.4.16, 7.4.19, 7.4.26)
[33]↩ It is unclear whether or not the Arkadians fielded a cavalry contingent.
[34]↩ It is unclear whether or not the Akhaians fielded a cavalry contingent.
[35]↩ Xenophon did not even mention the Mantinean campaign of 362 BCE at all in his biography/eulogy of Agesilaos. Xenophon called Agesilaos aēttētos (undefeated). If Xenophon was being honest, Agesilaos could not have been called ‘undefeated’ if he had commanded at Mantinea. It is true that Xenophon considered the battle of Mantinea to have been a draw, but Xenophon himself conceded that the Lakedaimonians had been routed! (Xenophon. Agesilaos 10.4)
[36]↩ The 44 year long reign of the energetic yet ineffectual Lakedaimonian king Areus I (reigned 309–ca. 265 BCE) should illustrate this point. Taking advantage of the chaos following the deaths of the great Makedonian Successor kings Lysimakhos and Seleukos I Nikator in 281 BCE, Areus led a coalition of Greek states against the Aitolians, but he was defeated on the Kirrhan plain. Areus fought in Krete on the side of Gortynians and returned to Sparta in 272 BCE with 2,000 troops to help save Sparta from Pyrrhos, the king of Epeiros. The Lakedaimonians led by Areus then harassed the retreating Epeirote army killing Ptolemy, the son of Pyrrhos. In his rage, Pyrrhos himself attacked and slew the picked Lakedaimonians who had slain his son! Nonetheless, despite this substantial loss Areus was able to lead 1,000 lightly armed Kretans and Spartiatai to the aid of Argos where Pyrrhos himself was slain in the streets. As an ally of Ptolemy II Philadelphos, Areus led an army consisting of all of the Lakedaimonians to the aid of Athens during the Khremonidean War (267–261 BCE). However, he withdrew without daring to fight the Makedonian army of Antigonos II Gonatas. Areus fell near Korinth apparently in battle against Antigonos in ca. 265 BCE. (Diodoros. 20.29.1; Justin. 24.1; Plutarch. Pyrrhos 27.1, 29.6–30.6, 32.2; Pausanias. 3.6.4–6; Plutarch. Agis 3.4)
If you encounter a word or spelling with which you are unfamiliar, be sure to check the glossaries (see the links on the right under Reference Aids).
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| The Battlefield of Mantinea, Arkadia, Greece. (Image compliments of www.utexas.edu) |
THE ARMIES GATHER AT MANTINEA, 362 BCE
According to Pausanias the periēgētēs (8.11.5), the battle took place “hōs (about, nearly) 30 stadia (roughly 5.5 kilometres)” south of Mantinea.[6] This would place the battlefield at the narrowest part of the plain in what is known today as the Mytika Gap. This gap is over two kilometres wide, which would be sufficient for the deployment of the armies involved. It would also be an excellent location to protect the flanks of a smaller army. (William Kendrick Pritchett. Studies in Ancient Greek Topography Part II (Battlefields). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pages 63–66)
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| Battle of Mantinea, 362 BCE. |
Plutach related that the main battle near Mantinea was fought “oligais de hysteron hēmerais (a few days after)” the failed Theban assault on the city of Lakedaimon (Sparta). The cavalry skirmish would have taken place between those two events. Probably a day or so after the cavalry skirmish, Epameinondas and his infantry joined up with their cavalry and together they confronted the Lakedaimonian (Spartan) allied army at Mantinea. (Plutarch. Agesilaos 35)
THE THEBAN ALLIED ARMY AT MANTINEA
As mentioned above, the Theban allied army consisted of all of the Boiotians, the Euboians, and polys (many) of the Thessalians both from the Thessalian League and from the tyrant Alexander of Pherai. Diodoros included Akhaians [from Phthiotis?], Malians and Ainianes, who were all Thessalian subject-allies. Their Peloponnesian allies included the Argives, Messenians, and some of the Arkadians including the Tegeatans, Megalopolitans, Aseateans, Pallanteans, and other cities that, according to Xenophon, were “ēnankazonto (forced)” to serve in the Theban army. Diodoros described the Arkadians in the Theban allied army as the most numerous and the mightiest of the Arkadians. Diodoros also included the Lokrians and Sikyonians in the Theban army. The Theban totals, according to Diodoros, were “hyper (over) 30,000 infantry and ouk elattous (not less than) 3,000 cavalry”. These numbers are certainly questionable and more than likely did not include psiloi (light infantry), who are rarely enumerated by ancient writers. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.4-5; Diodoros 15.84.4, 15.85.2)
The following are guesstimates of the size of individual infantry contingents in the Theban allied army totalling “over 30,000 infantry”:
- 6,000 to 8,000 Boiotian hoplites plus numerous light infantry.[7]
- 2,000 to 4,000 Euboian hoplites.[8]
- Several hundred Lokrian hoplites plus much more numerous light infantry.[9]
- 4,000 to 6,000 Thessalian hoplites plus numerous light infantry. Diodoros (15.85.4) specifically mentioned slingers and javelineers, who were three times the number of their opponents.[10]
- 5,000 to 7,000 Argive hoplites.[11]
- 2,000 to 4,000 Messenian hoplites.[12]
- 4,000 to 6,000 Arkadian hoplites.[13] According to Xenophon (Hellēnika 7.5.20), the Arkadians inscribed clubs, the Theban device, on their shields.
- 1,000 to 2,000 Sikyonian hoplites.[14]
- 2,000 to 8,000 mercenary hoplites and peltasts (see below).
The following are guesstimates of the size of individual cavalry contingents in the Theban allied army totalling “not less than 3,000 cavalry”:
- 600 to 800 Boiotian cavalry.[15]
- 800 to 2,000 Thessalian cavalry, the best and most numerous cavalry in all of Greece. In order for the cavalry in the Theban allied army to have totalled 3,000 horsemen, there must have been a very large Thessalian contingent.[16]
- 200 to 400 Euboian cavalry.[17]
- Up to 200 Lokrian cavalry.[18]
- Up to 200 Argive cavalry.[19]
- Up to 200 Messenian cavalry.[20]
- Up to 200 Arkadian cavalry.[21]
- Up to 200 Sikyonian cavalry.[22]
- 200 to 800 mercenary cavalry (see below).
THE LAKEDAIMONIAN ALLIED ARMY AT MANTINEA
At the same time that Epameinondas and his infantry had arrived in the vicinity of Mantinea from the south, the Athenian infantry had also arrived at Mantinea from the northeast. Diodoros (15.84.2) wrote that the Athenians numbered 6,000 men and were commanded by Hegesileos. Diogenes Laertios (2.54) concurred that Hegesileos was the Athenian commander. This reinforcement of 6,000 Athenians swelled the Lakedaimonian allied ranks from roughly 14,000 to a respectable 20,000 hoplites with which the Lakedaimonian allies felt confident in opposing the larger Theban allied army. However, they apparently choose the narrow Mytika Gap as the battlefield to avoid being outflanked on both wings.
Neither Xenophon nor any other ancient author mentioned who was in command of the Lakedaimonians at the battle of Mantinea, but it may have been the obscure Agiad king Kleomenes II (reigned 370–309/308 BCE), the son of King Kleombrotos I (reigned 380–371 BCE) and the younger brother of King Agesipolis II (reigned 371–370 BCE).[23]
The Lakedaimonian (Spartan) allied army included Akhaians from the Peloponnesos, Eleians, Athenians, Mantineans, and some other unnamed Arkadians. As for the Lakedaimonians themselves, all of their cavalry and mercenaries were present, but they had been prevented by Epameinondas from reinforcing their army at Mantinea with additional Lakedaimonian hoplites. As a result, only three of the twelve Lakedaimonian lokhoi (companies) of hoplites were present at the battle! This was a tremendous disadvantage for the Lakedaimonians as in the past their own hoplites had always been the strongest part of any Lakedaimonian allied army. According to Diodoros, the Lakedaimonian allied army numbered “pleious (more than) 20,000 infantry and peri (around) 2,000 horsemen”. Like the totals for the Theban allied army, these figures are problematic. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.1, 7.5.10, 7.5.18; Diodoros. 15.84.4))
The following are guesstimates of the size of individual infantry contingents in the Lakedaimonian allied army totalling “more than 20,000 infantry”:
- 600 or fewer Lakedaimonian hoplites in three lokhoi.[24]
- 6,000 Athenians per Diodoros (15.84.2). This number may have included their cavalry.[25]
- 2,000 to 4,000 Eleian hoplites.[26]
- 2,000 to 5,000 Arkadian hoplites.[27]
- 2,000 to 5,000 Akhaian hoplites.[28]
- 1,000 to 2,000 Lakedaimonian mercenary hoplites and peltasts.[29]
- 2,000 to 6,000 other mercenary hoplites and peltasts (see below).
- Several thousand Lakedaimonian neodamōdeis (‘new people’, i.e. freed helots) and other hypomeiones (inferiors). Their presence at Mantinea is not mentioned by any ancient author. However, several thousand of them would certainly help to get the Lakedaimonian allied total over 20,000!
Obviously, what is striking about the above totals is the high proportion of Athenians and the minuscule number of Lakedaimonians (Spartans)!
The following are guesstimates of the size of individual cavalry contingents in the Lakedaimonian allied army totalling “around 2,000 cavalry”:
- 200 to 400 Lakedaimonian cavalry representing the entire Lakedaimonian cavalry corps.[30]
- 600 to 800 Athenian cavalry. Athens fielded the largest cavalry corps of the allies.[31]
- 200 to 400 Eleian cavalry. Elis maintained a notable cavalry corps.[32]
- Up to 200 Arkadian cavalry.[33]
- Up to 200 Akhaian cavalry.[34]
- 200 to 400 Lakedaimonian mercenary cavalry.
- 200 to 600 other mercenary cavalry (see below).
MERCENARIES AT THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA
At this point in Greek history, virtually every Greek state employed mercenaries. A few examples should suffice to illustrate this point. When the two Arkadian cities of Orkhomenos and Kleitor were at war with each other in ca. 378 BCE, the Kleitorians maintained a force of mercenaries, which was appropriated by the Lakedaimonian (Spartan) king Agesilaos (Xenophon. Hellēnika 5.4.36–37). The following year (ca. 377 BCE), mercenary peltasts were mentioned serving in the Theban army (Xenophon. Hellēnika 5.4.54). At the battle of Leuktra in 371 BCE, there was a unit in the Lakedaimonian army called Hieron’s mercenaries (Xenophon. Hellēnika 6.4.9). In ca. 366 BCE, the Sikyonian tyrant Euphron joined in a Theban attack on Phleious with the Sikyonians themselves and his personal corps of “peri (about) 2,000 mercenaries” (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.2.11). As for the Athenians, over the course of several decades we know of mercenary units led by Iphikrates, Khabrias, and Khares (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.4.9, 7.1.25, 7.2.20–21).
The only mercenaries mentioned by Xenophon as serving in the battle of Mantinea were mercenaries hired by the Lakedaimonians. However, there were undoubtedly many other mercenaries serving on both sides.
WAS THE LAKEDAIMONIAN KING AGESILAOS PRESENT AT THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA?
Once the Thebans had placed themselves between Lakedaimon (Sparta) and Mantinea, it surely would have been suicidal for the remaining nine Lakedaimonian lokhoi (companies)—which were in Lakedaimon and likely numbered fewer than 1,800 hoplites—to have set out from Sparta without the support of either cavalry or numerous, competent light infantry. Their challenge would have been to sneak past the Theban army of over 33,000 men and join the allied army at Mantinea, which was some 60 kilometres away as the bird flies! There were several routes and passes that the Lakedaimonian army could have taken, but the Theban allied army would only have needed to await their emergence into the Tegeatan plain. There this tiny Lakedaimonian relief force would surely have been overwhelmed by the numerous hoplites, cavalry, and excellent light infantry of the Theban allied army! Such a foolhardy march would no doubt have made the hellish mauling of the 600 Lakedaimonian (Spartan) hoplites near Lekhaion by Iphikrates in 391/390 BCE seem like a pleasant Lakedaimonian stroll through the countryside!
In addition, Agesilaos was certainly shrewd enough to know that he did not want to place the bulk of the tiny Lakedaimonian army in Mantinea with the much larger Theban allied army between it and the virtually defenseless city of Lakedaimon (Sparta)! Xenophon (Hellēnika 7.5.10) wrote that, if Agesilaos and his troops had not earlier returned in time, Epameinondas ”would have siezed the city like a nest of young birds altogether devoid of defenders”! This possibility was still a real threat even after Epameinondas withdrew. He could always return especially if he learned that Agesilaos was in Mantinea and that Lakedaimon was once again devoid of defenders! It must be remembered that Lakedaimon was unwalled, so it needed a sizeable force of competent warriors to defend it. An unwalled city could not be reliably defended by poorly armed and organized boys, old men, and women. That at any rate was Xenophon’s first hand opinion of the matter.
It should be noted that Xenophon did not record that his hero Agesilaos made such a bold attempt to reach Mantinea once the Thebans had withdrawn from Lakedaimon (Sparta). If King Agesilaos and the remaining nine Lakedaimonian lokhoi had indeed marched out from Lakedaimon following Epameinondas’ withdrawal and had successfully snuck into Mantinea ahead of Epameinondas, surely Xenophon would have lavished a huge amount of praise upon his favourite Lakedaimonian for such an amazing march that had outmanoeuvred Epameinondas! It should also be noted that neither Xenophon nor any other ancient author claimed that Agesilaos was present at the battle near Mantinea![35] I am therefore at a loss to understand why many modern authors place Agesilaos at the battle.
THE BATTLE (FINALLY!)
According to Xenophon, the battle of Mantinea was virtually over before it even began! The brilliant Epameinondas drew up his army for battle; but, rather than advancing directly against the enemy, he marched westwardly towards the mountains and successfully hoodwinked his opponents into believing that he was manoeuvring his army to encamp. He was not! (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.20–22)
Evidently, the Lakedaimonian allied army was positioned across the Mytika Gap at the narrowest part of the plain in order to protect their flanks from being turned by the larger Theban allied army. It seems that Epameinondas approached from his camp at Tegea and drew up his army in battle order. The Thebans may have offered battle at midday or later, but when their opponents refused to advance beyond their defensive position, Epameinondas pretended to be encamping for the night.
Once the Theban left wing reached the mountain, they grounded arms. Foolishly, their opponents relaxed their readiness for battle. Epameinondas was stationed on this wing and strengthened it with additional arriving companies. He then led the advance against his ill prepared opponents “antiprōron hōsper triērē (prow on like a trireme)”. According to Arrian (The Tactical Art 11.2) this attack included all of the Boiotians not just the Thebans in an embolos (ram) formation. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.22–23)
Epameinondas’ cavalry—apparently the Boiotian cavalry on the left wing—were drawn up in a strong embolos (ram or wedge) mixed with hamippoi (infantry runners). The enemy cavalry, on the other hand, were drawn up like a phalanx—in other words in a rectangular formation—and without hamippoi. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.23–24)
The weaker Theban right wing was held back. Opposite them, the Athenians were posted on the left wing of the Lakedaimonian allied army. Epameinondas placed cavalry and hoplites on some hills over against them. These troops threatened to attack the Athenians in the rear if they moved to aid their own right wing. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.23–24)
By holding back his right wing, Epameinondas apparently forced his opponents either to move their left wing out from the protection of the Mytika Gap or to keep the strong Athenian contingent unengaged in the battle.
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| An olpe (pitcher) called the Chigi Vase, ca.650–640 BCE (National Etruscan Museum, Villa Giulia, Rome) An early depiction of a Greek hoplite battle. |
According to Diodoros, the Mantineans and other Arkadians occupied the right wing followed by the Lakedaimonians, Eleians, and Akhaians. Diodoros agreed with Xenophon that the Athenians held the left wing. On the other side, the Thebans held their own left wing supported by their Arkadian allies; the Argives held the right wing. Both sides placed cavalry on each wing. In a confused description, Diodoros claimed that the Euboians and mercenaries were posted on some hills. These may have been the cavalry and hoplites mentioned by Xenophon on the hills on the Theban right. (Diodoros. 15.85.2–6, 15.87.3)
The Theban allied army quickly routed all of the enemy army including both their phalanx and their cavalry. However, before the Thebans and their allies could engage in a lengthy pursuit and massacre of their fleeing oponnents, Epameinondas was slain. The pursuit abruptly ceased. However, hamippoi and peltasts on the Theban right wing advanced unsupported and most were supposedly killed by the Athenians. Xenophon did not explain why the Theban allied cavalry and hoplites—whom he had mentioned as being stationed on this wing—did not prevent this slaughter! (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.24–25)
Both armies set up battle trophies and gave back some of the enemy dead under a truce as if victorious. Both sides also received back some of their own dead under a truce as if defeated. Xenophon observed that there was more confusion in Greece after the battle than there had been before the battle. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.26–27)
Unfortunately, the above is all that can be reliably related concerning the course of the battle!
The Siceliote (Sicilian Greek) Diodoros of Agyrion (floruit ca. 60–30 BCE)—also known by his Latinized name Diodorus Siculus—presented the most detailed account of the battle. Modern scholars almost universally believe that Diodoros’ account was derived from the history of Ephoros of Kyme (floruit 4th Century BCE). The highly respected ancient Greek historian Polybios of Megalopolis (12.25f.3) dismissed Ephoros’ account of the battle of Mantinea as geloios (laughable, ludicrous)! Diodoros’ account—whether derived from Ephoros or not—would certainly qualify as geloios!
In his appraisal of Diodoros’ account of the battle of Mantinea, W. K. Pritchett concludes:
“The account shows the classic scheme of a battle composed by a rhetor. The two armies confront each other with valor. At a given signal they join battle. The contest remains for a long time indecisive. Many brave men perish. One of the generals is killed. The engagement comes to a end with one army in flight. The usual battle is bound to have these three accompaniments: noise, bravery, and good luck.” (William Kendrick Pritchett. Studies in Ancient Greek Topography Part II (Battlefields). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Page 71)I will not waste my time nor the readers’ time by discussing Diodoros’ (15.84–87) ludicrous and fanciful account of the battle of Mantinea.
THE DEATH OF EPAMEINONDAS
Xenophon just barely even mentioned the death of Epameinondas simply writing “when at any rate this person fell”! Uncharacteristically, Xenophon had high praise for Epameinondas’ performance during this campaign writing that “indeed so far as acts of foresight and courage, the man seems to me to have left not one undone”. Xenophon added that “to have prepared the army so that none flinched from toil neither by night nor by day, not one withdrew from danger and although their supplies were scanty nevertheless they gladly obeyed. This to me seems to be admirable.” Apparently, all Epameinondas needed to do to be noticed and even receive a compliment from Xenophon was to get himself killed! (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.8, 7.5.19, 7.5.25)
Later writers expanded on the topic of Epameinondas’ death, but regrettably their accounts were coloured by melodrama and legend.
The account of the death of Epameinondas as given by Diodoros is the most melodramic. Diodoros wrote that Epameinondas wounded the Lakedaimonian commander and then was targeted by the Lakedaimonians, was swarmed, and was struck in the chest with a doru (spear). Epameinondas was then carried back out of the fray, was told of the Boiotian victory, and finally directed that the spear point be withdrawn resulting in his death. It is a scene worthy of the worst television melodrama or a dreadful Frank Miller pseudo-historical blockbuster. (Diodoros. 15.86.4–5, 15.87.1, 15.87.5–6)
The brief account of the Roman biographer Cornelius Nepos (floruit 1st Century BCE) is very similar. Epameinondas fought boldly, but was recognized by the Lakedaimonians and swarmed. He fell pierced by a thrown sparus (small spear with a barbed head). The Boiotians then overwhelmed their enemies and, when Epameinondas heard that news, he drew out the spear head and died. (Cornelius Nepos. Epaminondas 15.9)
Pausanias the periēgētēs wrote that, according to the Athenians and Thebans, Epameinondas was slain by Gryllos, the son of Xenophon! However, according to the Mantineans, he was slain by Makhairion of Mantinea and, according to the Lakedaimonians, Makhairion the Spartiate slew Epameinondas! Pausanias pointed out that the Mantineans honoured Gryllos with a public funeral and set up a stele where he fell whereas there were no monuments to an individual named Makhairion in either Mantinea or Sparta. However, as detailed above, Gryllos was apparently slain a day or two before the death of Epameinondas! In addition, Gryllos was buried near the walls of Mantinea whereas Epameinondas was buried roughly 5.5 kilometres away at the Mytika Gap. Both men were said to have been buried where they fell. Clearly none of Pausanias’ local legends concerning who killed Epameinondas can be considered reliable. (Pausanias. 8.11.5–6, 9.15.5, 8.9.5)
Pausanias also related that Epameinondas was carried alive from the battle. The point from which he watched the battle and died was called Skope (‘Lookout’). Epameinondas was buried at the spot where the two armies had met. On his grave stood a kiōn (columnar gravestone or pillar) with a shield with a drakōn (dragon) emblem denoting the Spartoi (‘Sown-men’, the Thebans who sprang from the dragon’s teeth sown in legend by Kadmos). There were also two inscribed steles, one with an old Boiotian inscription and another inscribed by the Emperor Hadrian. Regrettably, Pausanias did not record what either inscription said! (Pausanias. 8.11.7–8, 8.12.1)
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| Black-figured Amphora from Euboia, ca. 560–550 BCE. (Louvre Museum, Dept. of Greek, Etruscan, and Roman Antiquities) The legendary hero Kadmos slaying the dragon. (Image compliments of the Wikimedia Commons) |
Plutarch (ca. 45–125 CE) and Claudius Aelianus (ca. 165/170–222/238 CE) both related the questionable anecdote that Epameinondas received a mortal wound at Mantinea and was brought alive to a tent. There he called for Daiphantos and for Iolaidas each in turn to make them general, but was told that both men were already dead. Incidentally, neither man is otherwise known. Anyway, Epameinondas then supposedly advised the Thebans to make peace as they no longer had a general! (Plutarch. Sayings of Kings and Commanders 194.24; Aelian. Varia Historia 12.3)
Plutarch presented the most credible version of the death of Epameinondas. Plutarch stated that, according to the polyhistor Dioskourides (floruit Fourth–Third Centuries BCE), Epameinondas was slain by a Lakonian named Antikrates with a doru (spear). In Plutarch’s own day, the Lakedaimonians honoured Antikrates for slaying Epameinondas and granted tax exemption to his descendants. However, Plutarch noted that his descendants were known to the Lakedaimonians as the Makhairiones or ‘Swordsmen’ as Antikrates was said to have struck the fatal blow with a makhaira (sword) not a doru (spear) as Dioskourides contended. This explains the no doubt mistaken personal name Makhairion from Pausanias’ unreliable local sources. Plutarch submitted strong support for his story by relating that one of Antikrates’ descendants named Kallikrates enjoyed tax exemption even in Plutarch’s own time. (Plutarch. Agesilaos 35)
THE AFTERMATH OF THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA
Along with the death in Thessaly of the illustrious and beloved Theban leader Pelopidas two years earlier in 364 BCE, the death of Epameinondas at the battle of Mantinea in 362 BCE meant the end of the brief era of Theban pre-eminence. Though Thebes would remain a major Greek power, Thebes would never again be the hegemon of a large coalition of allied states.
Athens was evidentally little effected by the battle. Subsequently, Athens continued to treat its maritime allies in an increasingly heavy handed, imperial fashion. Five years after the battle of Mantinea, the so-called Second Athenian Confederacy (founded in ca. 378 BCE) effectively came to an end as a result of the successful revolts of Khios, Rhodes, Kos, and Byzantion. Athens remained a major Greek power following this revolt of its allies, called the Social War (357–355 BCE) by modern scholars. However, as war against the rising power of Makedon loomed, Athens like Thebes no longer led a large coalition of allied states.
The battle was far more momentous for the Lakedaimonians (Spartans) as it marked the end of Lakedaimon as a major Greek power. Never again would Lakedaimonian armies operate effectively outside of the Peloponnesos and their influence within the Peloponnesos was for the most part no greater than that of any other state.[36] A few years later, the Lakedaimonian king Agesilaos II (reigned ca. 401/400–360/359 BCE) drew his last breath at the age of 84 on the coast of Libya. Agesilaos had been returning home following his service as a mercenary commander in the employ of squabbling Egyptian rebels. Roughly 21 years later, his son Arkhidamos III (reigned 360/359–338 BCE) died in a minor war in southern Italy as a mercenary captain fighting the barbarian Lucanians in 338 BCE. This was the same year that the Thebans and Athenians put aside their differences and jointly led the unsuccessful opposition to the Makedonians at Khaironeia.
THE MAKEDONIAN CONQUEST OF GREECE
Twenty-four years after the battle of Mantinea, the Makedonian king Philip II (reigned 359–336 BCE)—the founder of Makedonia as a major power—decisively defeated a coalition of Greek states led by the Thebans and Athenians at the battle of Khaironeia in Boiotia in 338 BCE. Almost all of the Greeks of the mainland were subsequently enrolled in the new, so-called League of Korinth. This coalition of Greek states was formed by Philip to participate in a Makedonian led crusade against the Persian Empire. Lakedaimon (Sparta) was considered of so little importance that neither Philip nor his son Alexander the Great (reigned 336–323 BCE) wasted their time to force the Lakedaimonians to join this alliance.
Before Philip could lead this crusade against Persia, he was assassinated in 336 BCE. Philip’s death resulted in the rebellion of many Makedonian subjects including both Athens and Thebes. Philip’s young son and successor Alexander besieged and captured Thebes in 335 BCE. As an example to other rebels, Alexander sold the population into slavery and raised the city of Thebes to the ground. In addition to its historical fame, Thebes had been the mythological home of Kadmos, Dionysos, Herakles and Oidipous (Oedipus) as well as the site of the legendary wars known as the ‘Seven against Thebes’ and the Epigonoi (‘Offspring’ aka ‘Sons of the Seven against Thebes’). Only the temples and the house of the great Boiotian poet Pindar (518–438 BCE) were left standing in Thebes. Alexander’s barbarity against this renowned, major Greek city was shocking, but it had the desired effect. Athens and the other Greeks promptly submitted without further fighting. The following year, Alexander was free to lead the invasion of the mighty Persian Empire. (Arrian. Anabasis 1.7–9; Diodoros. 17.8–15; Plutarch. Alexander 11.4–6)
Following his first victory over the Persians at the Granikos River in Hellespontine Phrygia in 334 BCE, Alexander the Great sent 300 Persian panoplies from the spoils to Athens and ordered their dedication to be inscribed “Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks except for the Lakedaimonians [took these] from the barbarians dwelling in Asia” (Arrian. Anabasis 1.16.7 – my emphasis). The Lakedaimonians (Spartans) had been the heroes of the Persian War of 480–479 BCE. In 334 BCE, Alexander wished to emphasize their conspicuous absence from his Panhellenic crusade against the Persians.
In fact, rather than fight against the Persians, the Lakedaimonians (Spartans) accepted Persian money in 333 BCE, hired numerous mercenaries, and began hostilities in Greece against the Makedonians. The Persian king Dareios III (reigned 336-330 BCE) hoped that, by financing military operations to the rear of the young Makedonian king’s offensive, he could divert or delay Alexander, who was methodically advancing against him. However, Alexander was not deterred. Fortunately for Alexander, his general Antipater decisively defeated the Lakedaimonian king Agis III (reigned 338–331/330 BCE) and his army of Persian financed mercenaries at the battle of Megalopolis in Arkadia either in late 331 BCE or in early 330 BCE. Agis III, the son of Arkhidamos III, was slain in the battle. Thus the final Lakedaimonian (Spartan) undertaking during the Greek Classical Age (ca. 500–323 BCE) was sadly as Persian lackeys. This shameful Lakedaimonian (Spartan) effort on behalf of the Persians was too little and too late for the Lakedaimonians’ always questionable support for the liberty of other Greeks! (Arrian. Anabasis 2.13.4–6; Diodoros. 17.48.1–2, 17.62.6–17.63.4, 17.73.5–6; Curtius. 4.1.39–40, 6.1)
Alexander the Great defeated Dareios III at the battle of Gaugamela near Arbela (modern Erbil in northeast Iraq) on October 1st, 331 BCE. This historic battle was the death blow to the mighty kingdom of the Achaimenian Persians, who had ruled the largest empire in the world—up until that time—for roughly 220 years. Sometime afterwards, the 25 year old Alexander learned of the Lakedaimonian (Spartan) defeat at Megalopolis and was supposed to have commented in derision “It seems, men, that while we were here conquering Dareios, back in Arkadia there was a battle of mice!”. Such was the great Makedonian conqueror’s contempt for the Lakedaimonians (Spartans). (Plutarch. Agesilaos 15.4)
FOOTNOTES
[6]↩ Pausanias (8.11.5) wrote that the Athenian and Mantinean cavalry fought the Boiotian horsemen at the Pelagos grove “hōs (about, nearly) 30 stadia” (roughly 5.5 kilometres) south of Mantinea. Pausanias implied that this was the engagement in which Epameinondas was slain. This is apparently a jumbled account of the main battle in which Epameinondas died according to Xenophon (Hellēnika 7.5.25).
[7]↩ During the Peloponnesian War, the Boiotians in 424 BCE fielded “malista (about) 7,000 hoplites, hyper (more than) 10,000 psiloi (light infantry), 1,000 cavalry, and 500 peltasts” at their victory over the Athenians at Delion (Thoukydides. 4.93). In ca. 395 BCE, the Boiotian League was divided into 11 districts each of which was required to contribute “peri (around) 1,000 hoplites and 100 cavalry” to a league army (Hellēnika Oxyrhynkhia. fragment 16.3-4). Thus, in theory, the customary size for a Boiotian League army was 11,000 hoplites and 1,100 horsemen. The Boiotians—without the Orkhomenians—had deployed “peri (around) 5,000” hoplites at the battle of Nemea in the Peloponnesos in 394 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17). During their wars against the Lakedaimonians, the Thebans had destroyed the Boiotian cities of Plataia (ca. 374/373 BCE), Thespiai (prior to autumn 371 BCE), and Orkhomenos (364 BCE) (An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis. Pages 447, 450–451, 457). Their lands may have been distributed to new citizens. Nonetheless, there may have been a subsequent reduction in the number of Boiotian troops. The Boiotians reportedly dispatched 7,000 infantry and 600 cavalry under Epameinondas in his second Peloponnesian campaign in ca. 369 BCE (Diodoros. 15.68.1). In ca. 368 BCE, the Thebans supposedly dispatched 8,000 hoplites and 600 cavalry in an expedition into Thessaly (Diodoros. 15.71.3). According to the relatively trustworthy report of Plutarch (Pelopidas 35.1), the Thebans sent 7,000 hoplites and 700 cavalry into Thessaly following the death of Pelopidas in 364 BCE.
[8]↩ At the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE, there were “ouk elattous (not less than) 3,000” hoplites “from all of Euboia” (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17). Most of the Euboians defected from the Athenians in 371 BCE and allied with Thebes. “Euboians from all of their cities” were part of the Theban allied army that invaded Lakonike during the winter of 370/369 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 6.5.23). Euboia was dominated by four major cities: Khalkis and Eretria in the centre, Histiaia/Oreos in the north, and Karystos in the south. Thanks to inscriptions from the late Fourth Century and early Third Century BCE, it is estimated that Eretria had 6,000 adult male citizens (An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis. Page 652). It appears that Khalkis was of a similar size whereas Histiaia/Oreos and Karystos were smaller.
[9]↩ The Ozolian Lokrians (i.e. the western Lokrians) had contributed psiloi (light infantry) at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17). Later in the same year, both (i.e. eastern and western) Lokrians fought against the Lakedaimonians at the battle of Koroneia (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.3.15). According to Xenophon (Hellēnika 6.5.23), both (i.e. eastern and western) Lokrians served in the Theban allied army in the invasion of Lakonike during the winter of 370/369 BCE. So the inclusion of Lokrians in the Theban allied army at Mantinea by Diodoros (15.85.2) is reasonable.
[10]↩ According to Xenophon (Hellēnika 6.1.19), the Thessalians under Jason of Pherai in ca. 374 BCE could field “ouk elattous (not less than) 20,000 hoplites” and numerous peltasts!
[11]↩ The Argives had marshalled a large force of “peri (around) 7,000” hoplites at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17)
[12]↩ The numbers and composition of the Messenian army are unknown. During the Peloponnesian War (ca. 431–404 BCE), Thoukydides several times mentioned Messenian hoplites serving with distinction alongside the Athenians. These few Messenians had been settled at Naupaktos in western Lokris by the Athenians following their 10 year long revolt against the Lakedaimonians. (Thoukydides. 1.103, 2.90, 2.102, 3.75, 3.107–108, 4.9)
[13]↩ At the battle of Thermoplylai in 480 BCE, the Arkadians had contributed 500 Tegeatan, 500 Mantinean, 120 Orkhomenian, and 1,000 other Arkadian hoplites (Herodotos. 7.202). This Arkadian force of 2,120 hoplites dwarfed the Spartiatai contribution of only 300 hoplites. Nonetheless, the Arkadians had fielded only 1,500 Tegeatan and 600 Orkhomenian hoplites as well as an equal number of psiloi (light infantry) at the battle of Plataia in 479 BCE (Herodotos. 9.28). The Arkadians could have supplied numerous hoplites at the battle of Mantinea in 362 BCE. The Arkadian League assembly was called the Myrioi or ‘Ten Thousand’ apparently indicating the number of hoplites in the league army. However, it is unclear which Arkadian states contributed troops to the Theban allied army. Xenophon only mentioned the Tegeatans, Megalopolitans, Aseateans, and Pallanteans by name.
[14]↩ According to Xenophon (Hellēnika 7.1.18, 7.1.22, 7.1.44–46, 7.2.11, et al), the Sikyonians had been Theban allies since 369 BCE, so their inclusion in this campaign by Diodoros is quite likely. Sikyon had contributed 3,000 hoplites to the Greek army at Plataia in 479 BCE (Herodotos 9.28–29). The Sikyonians mobilized 1,500 hoplites at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.16).
[15]↩ As mentioned above in note # 7, in theory, the customary size of the cavalry contingent for a full Boiotian League army was 1,100 horsemen. The Boiotian cavalry had numbered “eis (about) 800” at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17).
[16]↩ According to Xenophon (Hellēnika 6.1.19), the Thessalians and their allies under Jason of Pherai in ca. 374 BCE could field “pleious (more than) 8,000 cavalry including their allies”! The army of Alexander the Great that invaded the Persians Empire included a contingent of 1,800 Thessalian horsemen.
[17]↩ During the Greek Archaic Age (ca. 800–500 BCE), the two most important Euboian cities, Eretria and Khalkis, were both noted for their cavalry. The Euboians from Khalkis had fielded “eis (about) 100” cavalry at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17). Thanks to inscriptions from the late Fourth Century and early Third Century BCE, it is estimated that Eretria had a cavalry force of probably 500 (An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis. Page 654).
[18]↩ The Opountian Lokrians—either Lokrians from the city of Opous or from eastern Lokris as a whole—contributed “eis (about) 50” cavalry against the Lakedaimonians at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17). Lokrian cavalry served in the Theban allied army that invaded Lakonike in 370/369 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 6.5.30).
[19]↩ It is unclear whether or not the Argives fielded a cavalry contingent.
[20]↩ It is unclear whether or not the Messenians fielded a cavalry contingent.
[21]↩ It is unclear whether or not the Arkadians fielded a cavalry contingent.
[22]↩ It is unclear whether or not the Sikyonians fielded a cavalry contingent.
[23]↩ Diodoros (15.82–84) claimed that the Lakedaimonian king Agis (a non-existent individual) commanded the full Lakedaimonian army and was plundering the territory of Tegea when Epameinondas attacked Sparta. Agis warned Agesilaos, who had been left behind on guard, and shortly thereafter the Lakedaimonian army arrived to rescue the city. However, Diodoros does not record who later commanded at the battle of Mantinea. Polybios (9.8) related that Agesilaos commanded the full Lakedaimonian army at Mantinea and subsequently this army marched south to rescue Lakedaimon (Sparta) from Epameinondas. Polybios does not describe the Lakedaimonian army’s return march to Mantinea nor the battle itself.
[24]↩ The length of this footnote soon got out of control, so I moved it too its own separate blog page entitled Lakedaimonian Numbers.
Based on the conclusions in the linked blog page, it seems highly unlikely that a lokhos would have numbered more than 200 Lakedaimonian hoplites in 362 BCE. Therefore, the twelve lokhoi, which formed the Lakedaimonian army, may have numbered 2,400 men or fewer.
[25]↩ The Athenians had deployed “eis (about) 6,000 hoplites” at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17)
[26]↩ “Three thousand Eleian hoplites” arrived too late to fight in the battle of Mantinea in 418 BCE on the side of the Mantineans (Thoukydides. 5.75.5). The Eleians, Triphylians, Akrorians, and Lasionians had assembled a force of “engys (nearly) 3,000” hoplites fighting on the Lakedaimonian side at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE, but how many of that number were Eleians is unknown (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.16). The Eleians must have been able to field an army of at least 6,000 hoplites. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand how they ever controlled such a large, fertile homeland as Eleia and ruled such a large perioikic territory as Triphylia or how they ever hoped to successfully battle the Arkadians in 365–363 BCE.
[27]↩ Xenophon was extremely vague about which Arkadians opposed the Thebans. The only Arkadians on the Lakedaimonian side that he explicitly named were the Mantineans! Xenophon also wrote that the Eparitoi sent ambassadors seeking aid from the Lakedaimonians. However, he does not mention the Eparitoi in his description of the battle. Likewise, Diodoros (15.85.2) simply referred to the “Mantineans along with the other Arkadians” on the right wing of the Lakedaimonian army. It is therefore difficult to estimate the Arkadian numbers. My estimate of up to 5,000 Arkadians seems excessive to me, but it is possible given the ambiguity of our sources. According to the orator Lysias (34.7), the citizen population of Mantinea numbered “oude (not even) three thousand”. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.5.1, 7.5.3, 7.5.14–18)
[28]↩ The numbers and composition of the Akhaian army are unknown.
[29]↩ According to Xenophon (Hellēnika 7.1.27), “polys (many) mercenaries” had been hired by a Persian agent, Philiskos of Abydos, to aid the Lakedaimonians in 368 BCE. Diodoros (15.70.2) recorded that Philiskos hired “2,000 chosen mercenaries” to aid the Lakedaimonians. The number of mercenaries in Lakedaimonian service in 362 BCE was likely low as it is doubtful that they had access to Persian funds at this time.
[30]↩ The Lakedaimonians had fielded “peri (around) 700 cavalry of the Lakedaimonians” at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.16). Thirty-two years later, the entire Lakedaimonian cavalry force was likely no more than half that size.
[31]↩ The Athenian cavalry had numbered “eis (about) 600” at the battle of Nemea in 394 BCE. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 4.2.17)
[32]↩ The Eleians maintained a small yet notable cavalry corps, which may have been called the Four Hundred. (Xenophon. Hellēnika 7.4.13–14, 7.4.16, 7.4.19, 7.4.26)
[33]↩ It is unclear whether or not the Arkadians fielded a cavalry contingent.
[34]↩ It is unclear whether or not the Akhaians fielded a cavalry contingent.
[35]↩ Xenophon did not even mention the Mantinean campaign of 362 BCE at all in his biography/eulogy of Agesilaos. Xenophon called Agesilaos aēttētos (undefeated). If Xenophon was being honest, Agesilaos could not have been called ‘undefeated’ if he had commanded at Mantinea. It is true that Xenophon considered the battle of Mantinea to have been a draw, but Xenophon himself conceded that the Lakedaimonians had been routed! (Xenophon. Agesilaos 10.4)
[36]↩ The 44 year long reign of the energetic yet ineffectual Lakedaimonian king Areus I (reigned 309–ca. 265 BCE) should illustrate this point. Taking advantage of the chaos following the deaths of the great Makedonian Successor kings Lysimakhos and Seleukos I Nikator in 281 BCE, Areus led a coalition of Greek states against the Aitolians, but he was defeated on the Kirrhan plain. Areus fought in Krete on the side of Gortynians and returned to Sparta in 272 BCE with 2,000 troops to help save Sparta from Pyrrhos, the king of Epeiros. The Lakedaimonians led by Areus then harassed the retreating Epeirote army killing Ptolemy, the son of Pyrrhos. In his rage, Pyrrhos himself attacked and slew the picked Lakedaimonians who had slain his son! Nonetheless, despite this substantial loss Areus was able to lead 1,000 lightly armed Kretans and Spartiatai to the aid of Argos where Pyrrhos himself was slain in the streets. As an ally of Ptolemy II Philadelphos, Areus led an army consisting of all of the Lakedaimonians to the aid of Athens during the Khremonidean War (267–261 BCE). However, he withdrew without daring to fight the Makedonian army of Antigonos II Gonatas. Areus fell near Korinth apparently in battle against Antigonos in ca. 265 BCE. (Diodoros. 20.29.1; Justin. 24.1; Plutarch. Pyrrhos 27.1, 29.6–30.6, 32.2; Pausanias. 3.6.4–6; Plutarch. Agis 3.4)
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