Last Modified on: 03-July-2015
The following is part 2 of a 10 part brief outline of the history of ancient Thessaly highlighting the famous Thessalian cavalry—and Greek cavalry in general—up to the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE. If you encounter a word or spelling with which you are unfamiliar, be sure to check the ‘Glossary of Names and Terms’ (see the link on the right under Reference Aids).
The following is part 2 of a 10 part brief outline of the history of ancient Thessaly highlighting the famous Thessalian cavalry—and Greek cavalry in general—up to the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE. If you encounter a word or spelling with which you are unfamiliar, be sure to check the ‘Glossary of Names and Terms’ (see the link on the right under Reference Aids).
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| Ancient Thessaly |
Kleomakhos of Pharsalos and the Lelantine War
The earliest mention of Thessalian warfare outside of greater Thessaly (i.e. Thessaly and its subject-allies) was the Thessalian participation in the so-called Lelantine War between Khalkis and Eretria on the large island of Euboia. As related by Plutarch (ca. 45–125 CE), Kleomakhos the Pharsalian led a Thessalian force to aid the Khalkideans—who were superior in infantry—against the Eretrieans—who were stronger in cavalry. Kleomakhos routed the Eretriean cavalry and won a great victory, but was slain in the battle. Plutarch wrote that in his own time the grave of Kleomakhos was still pointed out in the agora of Khalkis. It may be that some details of this war are legendary, but the conflict is likely based upon real events as the tomb of Kleomakhos would seem to signify. Other ancient writers offered little of value about the war.[1] The Lelantine War has been dated by modern scholars in a wide range from the Eighth Century to the Sixth Century BCE. (Plutarch. On Love 17)
The Amphiktyony, Eurylokhos of Thessaly, and the Krisaian War
The Amphiktyony—a league of “those dwelling nearby”—was originally responsible for the management of the temple of Demeter Amphiktyonis (“who dwells nearby”) at Anthele in Malis near the strategic pass of Thermopylai. Later—possibly in the mid-Seventh Century BCE—the Amphiktyony also assumed the administration of the celebrated temple of Apollo Pythios at Delphi in Phokis. Thereafter, the Synedrion (Council) of the Amphiktyones met yearly in the spring as well as in the autumn. One pylaia (meeting, session) was held at Anthele and another was held at Delphi. The earliest known Amphiktyonic membership lists consist of twelve members including the Phokians, Lokrians, Boiotians, Dorians, and Ionians. The other seven members were the Thessalians and their frequent subject-allies: the Phthiotic Akhaians, Magnesians, Perrhaibians, Malians, Dolopians, and Ainianes. Each of these ethnē (peoples) were represented by two hieromnēmones (“those mindful of sacred things”), who each had one vote, as well as by several non-voting delegates called pylagorai (“those who gather at the Gates” i.e. Thermopylai). Obviously, their control of the majority of Amphiktyonic votes gave the Thessalians great influence and prestige as well as the ability to periodically orchestrate affairs in central Greece.
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| Attic Red Figure Kylix attributed to the Kodros Painter, ca. 430 BCE. (Antikensammlung, Altes Museum, Berlin, Germany) The goddess Themis sits on a tripod as the Phthia or prophetess of the Delphic oracle. Aigeus, a mythological king of Athens, stands before her seeking a prophecy regarding his childlessness. After receiving an exceedingly cryptic response, Aigeus shortly thereafter fathered a son named Theseus. |
Strabon (floruit ca. 62 BCE–23/24 CE) reported that, during the Krisaian War, Eurylokhos of Thessaly destroyed the city of Krisa in Phokis. The Krisaians were accused of having imposed harsh tolls on those who came to visit nearby Delphi. This was contrary to the decrees of the Amphiktyones and no doubt Eurylokhos was the leader elected by the members of the Amphiktyony to punish Krisa. However, it should be pointed out that ancient authors wrote contrasting accounts of this war—sometimes against Krisa and sometimes against nearby Kirrha—and that many modern writers question its historicity. According to the dubious testimony of Polyainos (floruit ca. 162 CE), Eurylokhos advised the Amphiktyones to poison the water supply of Kirrha with hellebore, which was obtained from neighbouring Antikyra. The Kirrhaians became violently ill and as a result were easily defeated by the Amphiktyones. Following the Krisaian War, the Amphiktyones added equestrian and gymnastic contests to Delphi’s Pythian Games in addition to the original musical competitions. This is described as taking place in the time of Eurylokhos, which possibly indicates that the Thessalian leader presided over this innovation. Amongst all of the Greeks, the Panhellenic Pythian Games were second in importance only to the Olympic Games. The Krisaian War is also called the First Sacred War by modern historians and may have taken place sometime around 595/585 BCE.[2] (Strabon. 9.3.4, 9.3.10; Polyainos. 6.13)
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| Bronze Statue of a Charioteer, Delphi, ca. 470–450 BCE.[3] (Delphi Archaeological Museum, Delphi, Greece) An artistic masterpiece highlighting the passion for equestrian events by ancient Greeks in general and by Thessalians in particular. Originally part of a large statuary group almost certainly commemorating a chariot race victory in the Pythian Games. |
Kineas of *Kondaia, the Thessalians, and the Fall of the Peisistratidai of Athens
According to the account of Herodotos (ca. 485–424 BCE), the Peisistratidai of Athens—who were lead by the tyrant Hippias—learned of a planned Lakedaimonian [Spartan] attack and requested aid from the Thessalians, with whom they had an alliance. The Thessalians speedily sent 1,000 cavalry commanded by their basileus Kineas, a Koniaios man.[4] Having time to prepare, the Athenians levelled the plain of Phaleron for cavalry. After the Lakedaimonian army had disembarked from their ships at the Athenian port of Phaleron and were apparently making camp, they were attacked by the Thessalian horsemen. The Lakedaimonian commander Ankhimolios, the son of Aster, and many other Lakedaimonians were slain. The survivors fled back to their ships and sailed home. Presumably, the Thessalian cavalry had attacked before the Lakedaimonian hoplites were able to deploy into a phalanx.[5] Be that as it may, Herodotos noted that the tomb of Ankhimolios was located at Alopeke near the Herakleion in Kynosarges. Modern scholars locate Alopeke at modern Katsipodi a few kilometres to the south-southeast of Athens. The Herakleion was an altar to Herakles in a well known gymnasium called Kynosarges. The tomb of Ankhimolios was probably not located on the actual battlefield, which was likely nearer to Phaleron. Herodotos gave no indication of when this battle took place, but modern scholars estimate the date as ca. 511 BCE. (Herodotos. 5.63)
Even a hundred or more years after the life of Tyrtaios (floruit ca. mid-7th Century BCE)—the inspirational, martial Lakedaimonian [Spartan] poet laureate—the Lakedaimonians were clearly still not adverse to running for their lives instead of planting their feet and standing “in the foremost spears relentlessly, all thought of foul flight completely forgotten” as Tyrtaios (fragment 12) had preached. This incident and others expose the unmerited legend of Lakedaimonian [Spartan] invincibility and the fairy tale about their refusal to surrender or to run for their lives as ridiculous nonsense that in all likelihood only became part of popular mythology after the Persian Wars![6]
Meta (afterwards)—possibly the following year (ca. 510 BCE)—the Lakedaimonians [Spartans] responded to this ignominious defeat at the hands of the Thessalians by sending a larger army against Athens under the command of King Kleomenes I (reigned ca. 520–490 BCE). Arriving in Attica by land, Kleomenes routed the Thessalian cavalry, who lost more than 40 horsemen. Faced with a large Peloponnesian army and apparently anticipating limited support from the Athenians themselves, the remaining Thessalians withdrew back to Thessaly. It is not indicated whether or not Kineas was still in command. Thereafter, the Lakedaimonians and those Athenians who “wished to be free” besieged the Peisistratidai within the Pelasgic Wall on the Acropolis. By chance, the Lakedaimonians captured the children of the Peisistratidai as they were being spirited out of the country. In exchange for their release, the Athenian tyrant Hippias (ruled ca. 527–510 BCE) and his family went into exile. The Peisistratidai had ruled Athens for 36 years. Hippias withdrew to Sigeion on the Skamander River near Troy. Sigeion was a small Peisistratid stronghold in Persian territory at the entrance to the Hellespont. (Herodotos. 5.64–65)
Several years later (ca. 506–504 BCE?), the Lakedaimonians [Spartans]—fearing the rising power of a democratic Athens—reconciled with Hippias and planned to reinstate him as tyrant. Hippias was invited to Sparta where the Lakedaimonian proposal was presented to their allies for their rubber stamp approval. However, contrary to expectations, the plan was thwarted by the Korinthians, who—supported by most other Lakedaimonian allies—objected in the strongest terms to the idea of installing a tyrant. In the past, Greek tyrants had often come to power with popular support by toppling oligarchies. Since most of the Lakedaimonian allies were governed by oligarchies, they were not unexpectedly hostile to tyrants. Apparently as recompense for this public humiliation, king Amyntas I of Makedonia offered the border fort of Anthemous to Hippias. At the same time, the Thessalians offered him the Magnesian port of Iolkos as his stronghold. According to Greek mythology, Iolkos had been the home port of Jason and the Argonauts. It is unclear whether the status of Iolkos was unique or whether the Thessalians could do as they pleased with the territory of their subject-allies. It seems much more likely that the status of Iolkos must have been unique. Be that as it may, this offer may have been designed to allow their old ally to avoid returning to Persian controlled territory. However, Hippias declined both offers and returned to Sigeion from whence he lobbied his Persian overlord Artaphernes, the satrap at Sardis, to reinstate him. Hippias subsequently remained loyal to Persia during the Ionian Revolt of ca. 499–493 BCE whereas democratic Athens briefly aided the Ionian Greek rebels. Consequently, the Persian king Dareios I the Great (reigned ca. 521–486 BCE) decided to reinstate Hippias as tyrant of Athens. In 490 BCE, an elderly Hippias guided the Persian expeditionary force that landed at Marathon. There the historic Athenian and Plataian victory over the Persians put an end to Hippias’ dreams of ever returning to Athens. (Herodotos. 5.91–94, 5.96, 6.107)
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| Central Greece During the Sixth Century BCE |
Lattamyas of Thessaly and the Battle of Keressos
Plutarch (ca. 45–125 CE) mentioned in passing two great Boiotian victories which took place on the very same day of the year namely the fifth day of the Boiotian month Hippodromios, which the Athenians called Hekatombaiōn. The Boiotian month apparently honoured Poseidon, the patron of hippodromoi (horse races), and corresponded to July-August. The first Boiotian victory was against Lattamyas and the Thessalians at Keressos and the second was the Boiotian victory over the Lakedaimonians [Spartans] at Leuktra. Plutarch added that the victory over Lattamyas took place pleiōn (more than) 200 years before the victory at Leuktra. As the battle of Leuktra took place in 371 BCE, the battle of Keressos apparently took place some time prior to 571 BCE. (Plutarch. Camillus 19.2)
In another work, Plutarch claimed that the Thessalians had ruled over all of Greece as far as Thespiai in southeastern Boiotia and had enankhos (lately) been driven out by the Thebans, who slew the Thessalian commander Lattamyas. When Plutarch wrote ‘lately’, he was referring to a date not long before the battle of Thermopylai in 480 BCE. (Plutarch. On The Malice of Herodotos 33)
It is impossible to reconcile Plutarch’s two dates for the defeat of Lattamyas in a definitive determination without further information. Nonetheless, we can make an educated guess. The first date of prior to 571 BCE floats in the distant past without being linked to a contemporary event. His second date of shortly before 480 BCE is firmly linked to a time just prior to the battle of Thermopylai. Personally, I believe that it is reasonable to emend the date of more than 200 years prior to 371 BCE to a date of more than 100 years prior to 371 BCE. That would produce a date before 471 BCE, which could certainly mean before 480 BCE. In this way, Plutarch’s two dates for the defeat of Lattamyas would be in agreement.
Possibly referring to the same war, Pausanias the periēgētēs (floruit ca. 150 CE) stated that palai (long ago) the Thespieans had successfully taken refuge from the Thessalians in their stronghold of Keressos. (Pausanias. 9.14.2–3)
Thessaly and the ‘War Without a Truce’ Against the Phokians
Herodotos wrote that “ou polloisi etesi proteron (not many years prior to)” the 480 BCE invasion of Greece by the Persian king Xerxes (reigned ca. 486–465 BCE), the Thessalians and their allies invaded Phokis and besieged the Phokians on Mount Parnassos. On the advice of the seer Tellias of Elis, 600 of the best Phokians covered themselves and their armour in gypsum and attacked the Thessalians at night. Upon seeing these whitened and seemingly miraculous beings, the Thessalians fled in fear. The Phokians slew 4,000 Thessalian infantry. Half of the captured Thessalian shields were dedicated at Abai and the other half at Delphi. In addition, a tithe of the spoils taken from the Thessalians were used to dedicate statues at these two famous shrines of Apollo. In the words of Herodotos, this was what the Phokians did to the Thessalian infantry. (Herodotos. 8.27–28)
As for the Thessalian cavalry, when they invaded Phokis via the pass near Hyampolis in Phokis, the Phokians inflicted a devastating defeat upon them. This pass controlled the entry into northeastern Phokis via the narrow East Lokrian coastline stretching back to Thermopylai. The Phokians dug a great trench in the pass, filled it with empty jars, and covered it over. When the Thessalian cavalry charged, their horses’ legs plunged into the jars and were broken. Herodotos does not clearly state that these two Thessalian defeats followed one after the other, but that seems to be implied. (Herodotos. 8.28)
Pausanias the periēgētēs (ca. 115–180 CE) described this war between the Thessalians and Phokians a bit differently. Like Herodotos, Pausanias stated that the war took place proteron (before) the Persian invasion of Greece. As described by Pausanias, the war began with the defeat of the Thessalian cavalry in the pass near Hyampolis by means of the stratagem of the buried jars. Enraged at this slaughter of their cavalry, the Thessalians collected a larger army from all of their cities and once again invaded Phokis. The Phokians sent 300 picked men under the command of Gelon to reconnoitre sight unseen as night was falling, but they were all discovered and slaughtered by the Thessalian cavalry. This created such consternation in the Phokian camp that the Phokians gathered all of their women, children, and valuables together and placed them upon a large pyre guarded by 30 men. If the Phokians were defeated in battle, these men were ordered to slay the women and children, set the pyre on fire, and slay themselves. Thereafter, the Greeks called all such hard-hearted resolutions Aponoia Phokika (Phokian Desperation). The seer Tellias of Elis was entrusted with the overall command of the Phokian army. Rhoios of Ambryssos commanded the Phokian infantry and Daiphantes of Hyampolis commanded the Phokian cavalry. Marching out against the Thessalians, the Phokians won a remarkable victory, the most notable of the age. In honour of this great victory, the Phokians sent statues of Apollo, Tellias, their other generals, as well as statues of their native heroes as offerings to Delphi. Husteron (later) when their encampments were near each other in the eisbolē (pass, entrance) into Phokis, Tellias sent 500 picked Phokians daubed with gypsum and wearing white armour to attack the Thessalians at night during a full moon. This resulted in an exceptionally great slaughter of the Thessalians, who thought that their opponents were theioteron (divine or more than human). (Pausanias. 10.1.3–11)
Plutarch (ca. 45–125 CE) described this war as a polemos aspondos (war without a truce). It began when the Phokians slew all of the Thessalian arkhontes (rulers) and tyrannoi (tyrants) in the Phokian cities on a single day! The Thessalians responded by slaying 250 Phokian hostages and invading Phokis via Lokris with the levy of their entire army. The Thessalians proclaimed that they would spare no man of military age and that they would sell the Phokian women and children into slavery. Daiphantos, the son of Bathyllios, persuaded the Phokian men to meet the Thessalians in battle and to place all of their women and children on a pyre, which would be set alight if the Phokians were defeated. The Phokian women and children both voted and accepted this plan. The women praised Daiphantos, who was one of three Phokian commanders, for conceiving the plan. Henceforth, the Greeks called this Phokian resolution Aponoia (Desperation). The Phokians then defeated the Thessalians at Kleonai in the territory of Hyampolis. In commemoration of this victory, the Phokians celebrated the Elaphebolia—the greatest Phokian festival—in honour of Artemis even unto Plutarch’s own time. (Plutarch. Virtues of Women 2)
It is clear that the Thessalians were militarily involved throughout central Greece during the Sixth and early Fifth Centuries BCE. The prominent status of Thessaly in the Amphiktyony was undoubtedly a pivotal factor in their foreign policy during this period. Regrettably, we do not have enough details to determine whether there was a concerted effort to establish a Thessalian hegemony over central Greece or whether the Thessalians simply responded to sporadic events into which they were drawn by their alliances. Lattamyas may have been a central figure in establishing and/or maintaining Thessalian hegemony over central Greece. This would account for his fame. Be that as it may, it is clear that the famous Thessalian cavalry figured prominently in these conflicts.
Conjectural Reconstruction of the Era of Thessalian Hegemony Over Central Greece
Obviously, there is much in the accounts of Herodotos, Pausanias, and Plutarch about this era in Thessalian history that is divergent or in other words develops the narrative in different directions. Nevertheless, there is nothing in their accounts that seriously contradicts each other. The following is my conjectural reconstruction of the wars. The sequence of events of the ‘the war without a truce’ follows the account of Pausanias, who is the only one of the three writers to describe all three battles of this Thessalian-Phokian war and to claim to place those battles in chronological order.
The Thessalian cavalry’s ability to ride across both Phokis and Boiotia on their way to aid the Peisistratidai of Athens in ca. 511 and ca. 510 BCE may have been due to their control of both states. The Thessalians may well have ruled over most of central Greece—as Plutarch claimed—until their defeats at the hands of the Boiotians and Phokians.
The Boiotian victory at Keressos on the fifth day of the Boiotian month Hippodromios may have come first sometime in the years or decades immediately prior to 480 BCE. I suggest that the Boiotian revolt came first as an earlier successful Phokian revolt would have made it much more difficult for the Thessalians to have marched an army across an independent Phokis to reach Boiotia. In any event, the Thessalian commander Lattamyas was slain in the battle by the Thebans and he was apparently famous enough to have made that noteworthy. No Theban or other Boiotian commander is mentioned and Lattamyas is the only Thessalian named during the wars against the Boiotians and Phokians.
Following this victory by the Thebans and the other Boiotians, the Phokians may well have been inspired to rise in revolt against the Thessalians and to slay all of the Thessalian rulers and tyrants in the Phokian cities thus initiating the ‘the war without a truce’. It is unclear whether these Thessalian rulers and tyrants were Thessalians or were Phokian collaborators. Perhaps they were a mix of both such individuals. Be that as it may, in response, the Thessalians slew 250 Phokian hostages and may have then quickly dispatched a cavalry force against the Phokians in hopes of suppressing the rebellion in its inception. The Phokians dug a great trench in the pass north of Hyampolis, filled it with empty jars, and covered it over. When the Thessalian cavalry charged, their horses’ legs plunged into the jars and were broken.
Enraged at this slaughter of their cavalry, the Thessalians may then have levied their entire army and invaded Phokis via Lokris. The campaign began badlly for the Phokians when 300 picked men under the command of Gelon were slaughtered by the Thessalian cavalry. The Thessalians made the mistake of proclaiming that they would spare no man of military age and would sell the Phokian women and children into slavery. This threat no doubt galvanized Phokian resistance and, despite their fear of the large force arrayed against them, the Phokian men were persuaded by Daiphantos, the son of Bathyllios, to face the Thessalians in battle. They placed all of their women, children, and valuables together on a pyre with orders to slay them and set the pyre alight if the Phokian army was defeated. The Greeks subsequently called all such forlorn resolutions ‘Phokian Desperation’. The Phokian commander-in-chief was Tellias of Elis, a seer from the Peloponnesos. Perhaps Tellias was a noted military commander or perhaps the Phokians chose to put their lives into the hands of a man who—they hoped—could foresee their way to victory. Be that as it may, Daiphantes of Hyampolis commanded the Phokian cavalry and Rhoios of Ambryssos commanded the Phokian infantry. At Kleonai in the territory of Hyampolis, the Phokians won a remarkable victory over the Thessalians. According to Pausanias, this triumph was the most notable victory of the age. This Phokian victory may have put an end to the year’s campaigning season and may have temporarily driven the Thessalians from Phokis. In commemoration of this great victory, the Phokians dedicated statues as offerings at Delphi and for centuries celebrated their greatest national festival, the Elaphebolia, in honour of Artemis.
However, the Thessalians apparently regrouped—perhaps in the following year under new commanders—and once again invaded Phokis. As before, the Phokians were heavily outnumbered, but this time they chose to take refuge on Mount Parnassos. Tellias was still in command and conceived a remarkable stratagem. During a full moon, 500 to 600 picked men covered themselves and their armour in gypsum and attacked the Thessalian camp at night. Upon seeing these whitened and seemingly miraculous beings, the Thessalians panicked and fled suffering 4,000 casualties. Thus the Phokians succeeded in securing their freedom from the Thessalians. In thanksgiving, they dedicated the Thessalians’ shields and a tithe of the spoils at the temples of Apollo at both Delphi and Abai.
Go to Part 3
In another work, Plutarch claimed that the Thessalians had ruled over all of Greece as far as Thespiai in southeastern Boiotia and had enankhos (lately) been driven out by the Thebans, who slew the Thessalian commander Lattamyas. When Plutarch wrote ‘lately’, he was referring to a date not long before the battle of Thermopylai in 480 BCE. (Plutarch. On The Malice of Herodotos 33)
It is impossible to reconcile Plutarch’s two dates for the defeat of Lattamyas in a definitive determination without further information. Nonetheless, we can make an educated guess. The first date of prior to 571 BCE floats in the distant past without being linked to a contemporary event. His second date of shortly before 480 BCE is firmly linked to a time just prior to the battle of Thermopylai. Personally, I believe that it is reasonable to emend the date of more than 200 years prior to 371 BCE to a date of more than 100 years prior to 371 BCE. That would produce a date before 471 BCE, which could certainly mean before 480 BCE. In this way, Plutarch’s two dates for the defeat of Lattamyas would be in agreement.
Possibly referring to the same war, Pausanias the periēgētēs (floruit ca. 150 CE) stated that palai (long ago) the Thespieans had successfully taken refuge from the Thessalians in their stronghold of Keressos. (Pausanias. 9.14.2–3)
Thessaly and the ‘War Without a Truce’ Against the Phokians
Herodotos wrote that “ou polloisi etesi proteron (not many years prior to)” the 480 BCE invasion of Greece by the Persian king Xerxes (reigned ca. 486–465 BCE), the Thessalians and their allies invaded Phokis and besieged the Phokians on Mount Parnassos. On the advice of the seer Tellias of Elis, 600 of the best Phokians covered themselves and their armour in gypsum and attacked the Thessalians at night. Upon seeing these whitened and seemingly miraculous beings, the Thessalians fled in fear. The Phokians slew 4,000 Thessalian infantry. Half of the captured Thessalian shields were dedicated at Abai and the other half at Delphi. In addition, a tithe of the spoils taken from the Thessalians were used to dedicate statues at these two famous shrines of Apollo. In the words of Herodotos, this was what the Phokians did to the Thessalian infantry. (Herodotos. 8.27–28)
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| Mount Parnassos, Phokis, Greece. (Image compliments of the Wikimedia Commons) |
As for the Thessalian cavalry, when they invaded Phokis via the pass near Hyampolis in Phokis, the Phokians inflicted a devastating defeat upon them. This pass controlled the entry into northeastern Phokis via the narrow East Lokrian coastline stretching back to Thermopylai. The Phokians dug a great trench in the pass, filled it with empty jars, and covered it over. When the Thessalian cavalry charged, their horses’ legs plunged into the jars and were broken. Herodotos does not clearly state that these two Thessalian defeats followed one after the other, but that seems to be implied. (Herodotos. 8.28)
Pausanias the periēgētēs (ca. 115–180 CE) described this war between the Thessalians and Phokians a bit differently. Like Herodotos, Pausanias stated that the war took place proteron (before) the Persian invasion of Greece. As described by Pausanias, the war began with the defeat of the Thessalian cavalry in the pass near Hyampolis by means of the stratagem of the buried jars. Enraged at this slaughter of their cavalry, the Thessalians collected a larger army from all of their cities and once again invaded Phokis. The Phokians sent 300 picked men under the command of Gelon to reconnoitre sight unseen as night was falling, but they were all discovered and slaughtered by the Thessalian cavalry. This created such consternation in the Phokian camp that the Phokians gathered all of their women, children, and valuables together and placed them upon a large pyre guarded by 30 men. If the Phokians were defeated in battle, these men were ordered to slay the women and children, set the pyre on fire, and slay themselves. Thereafter, the Greeks called all such hard-hearted resolutions Aponoia Phokika (Phokian Desperation). The seer Tellias of Elis was entrusted with the overall command of the Phokian army. Rhoios of Ambryssos commanded the Phokian infantry and Daiphantes of Hyampolis commanded the Phokian cavalry. Marching out against the Thessalians, the Phokians won a remarkable victory, the most notable of the age. In honour of this great victory, the Phokians sent statues of Apollo, Tellias, their other generals, as well as statues of their native heroes as offerings to Delphi. Husteron (later) when their encampments were near each other in the eisbolē (pass, entrance) into Phokis, Tellias sent 500 picked Phokians daubed with gypsum and wearing white armour to attack the Thessalians at night during a full moon. This resulted in an exceptionally great slaughter of the Thessalians, who thought that their opponents were theioteron (divine or more than human). (Pausanias. 10.1.3–11)
Plutarch (ca. 45–125 CE) described this war as a polemos aspondos (war without a truce). It began when the Phokians slew all of the Thessalian arkhontes (rulers) and tyrannoi (tyrants) in the Phokian cities on a single day! The Thessalians responded by slaying 250 Phokian hostages and invading Phokis via Lokris with the levy of their entire army. The Thessalians proclaimed that they would spare no man of military age and that they would sell the Phokian women and children into slavery. Daiphantos, the son of Bathyllios, persuaded the Phokian men to meet the Thessalians in battle and to place all of their women and children on a pyre, which would be set alight if the Phokians were defeated. The Phokian women and children both voted and accepted this plan. The women praised Daiphantos, who was one of three Phokian commanders, for conceiving the plan. Henceforth, the Greeks called this Phokian resolution Aponoia (Desperation). The Phokians then defeated the Thessalians at Kleonai in the territory of Hyampolis. In commemoration of this victory, the Phokians celebrated the Elaphebolia—the greatest Phokian festival—in honour of Artemis even unto Plutarch’s own time. (Plutarch. Virtues of Women 2)
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Grave stele from Pelinna, Thessaly, Mid Fourth Century BCE. (Musée du Louvre, Paris, France) A Thessalian heavy cavalryman wearing a so-called Phrygian helmet, apparently a linen cuirass with pteryges, and a cloak. |
It is clear that the Thessalians were militarily involved throughout central Greece during the Sixth and early Fifth Centuries BCE. The prominent status of Thessaly in the Amphiktyony was undoubtedly a pivotal factor in their foreign policy during this period. Regrettably, we do not have enough details to determine whether there was a concerted effort to establish a Thessalian hegemony over central Greece or whether the Thessalians simply responded to sporadic events into which they were drawn by their alliances. Lattamyas may have been a central figure in establishing and/or maintaining Thessalian hegemony over central Greece. This would account for his fame. Be that as it may, it is clear that the famous Thessalian cavalry figured prominently in these conflicts.
Conjectural Reconstruction of the Era of Thessalian Hegemony Over Central Greece
Obviously, there is much in the accounts of Herodotos, Pausanias, and Plutarch about this era in Thessalian history that is divergent or in other words develops the narrative in different directions. Nevertheless, there is nothing in their accounts that seriously contradicts each other. The following is my conjectural reconstruction of the wars. The sequence of events of the ‘the war without a truce’ follows the account of Pausanias, who is the only one of the three writers to describe all three battles of this Thessalian-Phokian war and to claim to place those battles in chronological order.
The Thessalian cavalry’s ability to ride across both Phokis and Boiotia on their way to aid the Peisistratidai of Athens in ca. 511 and ca. 510 BCE may have been due to their control of both states. The Thessalians may well have ruled over most of central Greece—as Plutarch claimed—until their defeats at the hands of the Boiotians and Phokians.
The Boiotian victory at Keressos on the fifth day of the Boiotian month Hippodromios may have come first sometime in the years or decades immediately prior to 480 BCE. I suggest that the Boiotian revolt came first as an earlier successful Phokian revolt would have made it much more difficult for the Thessalians to have marched an army across an independent Phokis to reach Boiotia. In any event, the Thessalian commander Lattamyas was slain in the battle by the Thebans and he was apparently famous enough to have made that noteworthy. No Theban or other Boiotian commander is mentioned and Lattamyas is the only Thessalian named during the wars against the Boiotians and Phokians.
Following this victory by the Thebans and the other Boiotians, the Phokians may well have been inspired to rise in revolt against the Thessalians and to slay all of the Thessalian rulers and tyrants in the Phokian cities thus initiating the ‘the war without a truce’. It is unclear whether these Thessalian rulers and tyrants were Thessalians or were Phokian collaborators. Perhaps they were a mix of both such individuals. Be that as it may, in response, the Thessalians slew 250 Phokian hostages and may have then quickly dispatched a cavalry force against the Phokians in hopes of suppressing the rebellion in its inception. The Phokians dug a great trench in the pass north of Hyampolis, filled it with empty jars, and covered it over. When the Thessalian cavalry charged, their horses’ legs plunged into the jars and were broken.
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| Hyampolis, Phokis, Greece. (Image compliments of the Wikimedia Commons) |
Enraged at this slaughter of their cavalry, the Thessalians may then have levied their entire army and invaded Phokis via Lokris. The campaign began badlly for the Phokians when 300 picked men under the command of Gelon were slaughtered by the Thessalian cavalry. The Thessalians made the mistake of proclaiming that they would spare no man of military age and would sell the Phokian women and children into slavery. This threat no doubt galvanized Phokian resistance and, despite their fear of the large force arrayed against them, the Phokian men were persuaded by Daiphantos, the son of Bathyllios, to face the Thessalians in battle. They placed all of their women, children, and valuables together on a pyre with orders to slay them and set the pyre alight if the Phokian army was defeated. The Greeks subsequently called all such forlorn resolutions ‘Phokian Desperation’. The Phokian commander-in-chief was Tellias of Elis, a seer from the Peloponnesos. Perhaps Tellias was a noted military commander or perhaps the Phokians chose to put their lives into the hands of a man who—they hoped—could foresee their way to victory. Be that as it may, Daiphantes of Hyampolis commanded the Phokian cavalry and Rhoios of Ambryssos commanded the Phokian infantry. At Kleonai in the territory of Hyampolis, the Phokians won a remarkable victory over the Thessalians. According to Pausanias, this triumph was the most notable victory of the age. This Phokian victory may have put an end to the year’s campaigning season and may have temporarily driven the Thessalians from Phokis. In commemoration of this great victory, the Phokians dedicated statues as offerings at Delphi and for centuries celebrated their greatest national festival, the Elaphebolia, in honour of Artemis.
However, the Thessalians apparently regrouped—perhaps in the following year under new commanders—and once again invaded Phokis. As before, the Phokians were heavily outnumbered, but this time they chose to take refuge on Mount Parnassos. Tellias was still in command and conceived a remarkable stratagem. During a full moon, 500 to 600 picked men covered themselves and their armour in gypsum and attacked the Thessalian camp at night. Upon seeing these whitened and seemingly miraculous beings, the Thessalians panicked and fled suffering 4,000 casualties. Thus the Phokians succeeded in securing their freedom from the Thessalians. In thanksgiving, they dedicated the Thessalians’ shields and a tithe of the spoils at the temples of Apollo at both Delphi and Abai.
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FOOTNOTES
[1]↩ Plutarch (Symposium of the Seven Sages 10) mentioned the death of a great Khalkidean warrior named Amphidamas, who died in battle during the war against the Eretrieans over the Lelanton (i.e. the Lelantine plain). The two great poets Homer and Hesiod supposedly competed for a prize at his funeral with Hesiod taking the tripod as the victor. Hesiod (Works and Days 650–659) himself confirmed his victory in this contest, but did not mention Homer! Herodotos (5.99) wrote that before the Ionian Revolt of ca. 499 BCE the Milesians of Ionia had aided the Eretrieans in war whereas the Samians of Ionia had come to aid the Khalkideans. Thoukydides (1.15.3) simply noted that palai (long ago) most of the other Greeks had sided as allies of either the Khalkideans or the Eretrieans in war. Strabon (10.1.12) recorded that in the dispute over the Lelanton, the Eretrieans and Khalkideans agreed to ban the use of missiles.
[2]↩ Aiskhines (Against Ktesiphon 3.107–112) briefly mentioned that the Amphiktyones declared war on the motion of Solon of Athens against the Kirrhaians, who were enslaved. Their port and city were razed to the ground and their lands were declared sacred. Pausanias (10.37.4–8) claimed that Krisa was the ancient name of Kirrha. He mentioned the tyrant Kleisthenes of Sikyon and the lawgiver Solon of Athens as the Amphiktyonic leaders in a successful war against Kirrha. Solon was credited with poisoning the River Pleistos with hellebore, which led to the capture of Kirrha. The late 1st Century CE Roman writer Sextus Julius Frontinus (Stratagems 3.7.6) claimed that it was Kleisthenes of Sicyon who poisoned the Krisaians’ water supply with hellebore. For the question of the historicity of the Krisaian War see: Noel Robertson. “The Myth of the First Sacred War”. The Classical Quarterly, New Series, vol. 28, no. 1 (1978), pages 38–73.
[3]↩ The statue’s connection with an inscribed base (not shown), which mentions Polyzalos and a ruler of Gela in Sicily, is problematic. For the statue’s date and the many issues regarding the inscribed base, see Gianfranco Adornato. “Delphic Enigmas? The Γέλας ἀνάσσων, Polyzalos, and the Charioteer Statue”. American Journal of Archaeology, vol. 112, no. 1 (Jan. 2008), pages 29–55.
[4]↩ The Thessalian basileus Kineas, a Koniaios man, was in all likelihood not a king, which is the standard meaning of basileus. Instead, Kineas was likely the military leader of the Thessalian koinon. Other Greek states used the title basileus even after the fall of their kings. For example, Athens had a magistrate called the arkhōn basileus.
Koniaios is an unknown Thessalian city ethnic (e.g. Larisaios for an individual from Larisa). It is possibly a typo for *Kondaios, which is theorized to have been the earlier form of Kondaieus, a Thessalian city ethnic used in a Hellenistic inscription. The proposed city name is *Kondaia, site unknown. (An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis: An Investigation Conducted by The Copenhagen Polis Centre for the Danish National Research Foundation. [Edited by] Mogens Herman Hansen and Thomas Heine Nielsen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Page 694)
[5]↩ Leslie J. Worley (Hippeis: The Cavalry of Ancient Greece. (History and Warfare). Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. Pages 51–53) argues that the Thessalian victory was “almost certainly a standard battle, with the Thessalian cavalry successfully attacking a phalanx”. Worley emphasizes the difficulty in surprising the Lakedaimonians [Spartans] and argues that common sense would have alerted their commander to the threat. I respond by pointing out that a veritable host of combatants have lost their lives in battle due to the lack of common sense on the part of their commanders! Nonetheless, Worley correctly points out that the Lakedaimonian hoplites almost certainly lacked cavalry and light infantry support and that the relatively small size of their force “meant that either the phalanx could not stretch across the entire plain and thus that the flanks were unprotected and the phalanx subject to flanking attack or encirclement or, alternatively, that to stretch across the plain, the phalanx was deployed thinly, less than the normal 8 men deep that the Spartans preferred. A thin phalanx was a weak one and one that could be broken.” However, Worley seems to ignore the fact that Herodotos wrote that the Thessalian cavalry attacked the Lakedaimonian stratopedon (camp or encamped army), which certainly implies that the Lakedaimonians did not have time to draw up their army for a standard battle.
[6]↩ I am working on a blog page entitled ‘The Myth of Spartan Invincibility’. In the meanwhile, here are two, additional examples that disprove the Lakedaimonian [Spartan] claim of invincibility and the assertion that they would refuse to surrender or to run for their lives.
The Lakedaimonians [Spartans] attacked Tegea in ca. 570/560 BCE and were so confident that they would easily vanquish the southeastern Arkadian city that they brought fetters with which to enslave the Tegeatans. However, the Tegeatans not only defeated the Lakedaimonians, but they even placed these fetters upon their numerous Lakedaimonian captives and set them to work in their fields. These very chains were displayed in the temple of Athena Alea in Tegea and both Herodotos (ca. 485–424 BCE) and Pausanias the periēgētēs (ca. 115–180 CE) reported that they were still on display in their own times. In addition, Pausanias reported that the Tegeatans celebrated a festival called Halōtia (Capture) to commemorate capturing the greater part of the Lakedaimonian army in battle. (Herodotos. 1.66; Pausanias. 3.7.3, 8.45.3, 8.47.2, 8.47.4)
Despite the idealistic exhortations of Tyrtaios (fragment 10) that a courageous warrior should “not be fond of life when doing battle” and that it is “a noble thing for a brave man to die having fallen in the front ranks doing battle for one’s fatherland”, the real life Lakedaimonians [Spartans] were clearly still fond of life and even submitted to being taken captive en masse on the battlefield in order to save their lives.
Years later, the Lakedaimonian king Kleomenes I (reigned ca. 520–490 BCE) intervened in Athens in ca. 508/507 BCE and ordered the Athenians to expel the Alkmaionid leader Kleisthenes, who had been promoting democratic reforms. Kleisthenes fled Attica and Kleomenes soon arrived with a small force, perhaps the customary 300 Spartiatai of the king’s bodyguard. Kleomenes exiled 700 Athenian households and then attempted to dissolve the Athenian Boulē (Council). Meeting with resistance, Kleomenes occupied the Athenian Acropolis. Thereupon, the Athenian populace rose up in support of the democratic reforms and laid siege to the Lakedaimonians on the Acropolis. Kleomenes was forced to surrender the Acropolis on the third day of the siege and depart Attica, but he was permitted to withdraw only with his Lakedaimonian troops. Shamelessly, the Lakedaimonians [Spartans] deserted their allies, who were put to death by the Athenian democrats! (Herodotos. 5.69–73; Aristotle. Constitution of the Athenians 19; Thoukydides. 1.126–127; Plutarch. Solon 12)
Kleomenes was the older half-brother of Leonidas I (reigned ca. 490–480 BCE) with a much more distinguished career than Leonidas. Sparta’s reputation was at its zenith at the time of the Persian Wars in no small part thanks to the cleverness and ruthlessness of Kleomenes, who apparently died at about the same time as the first Persian expedition against mainland Greece in 490 BCE. Kleomenes and his elite Lakedaimonian [Spartan] warriors on the Acropolis clearly had no intention of heroically fighting to the death in accordance with an impractical code of honour that did not permit either surrender or retreat. Instead, the real life Lakedaimonians made the rational decision to capitulate and ingloriously flee Attica in order to fight again another day in more favourable circumstances. This was completely contrary to the fanciful admonishments of the Lakedaimonian poet laureate Tyrtaios (fragment 12) that “all thought of foul flight” be “completely forgotten”.
However, what is far more damning to the Lakedaimonians’ heroic, martial reputation was their contemptible abandonment of their allies to their deaths in order to save their own skins! This cold-blooded and self-centred action should certainly raise considerable doubts about the likelihood that—roughly 27 years later at Thermopylai—Leonidas and 300 Spartiatai selflessly sacrificed their own lives in order to save other Greeks! Such a noble sacrifice would have been completely contrary to all we know about the mean spirited and egomaniacal Spartiatai. The far-fetched legend of Thermopylai—which is clearly not supported by the facts—is simply pro-Lakedaimonian propaganda which was promulgated in ancient times by anti-democratic, conservative authors and has been uncritically popularized in modern times by Nazi pseudoscience about the racial superiority of the Aryans (amongst whom the Nazis proudly included the ancient Spartans), by the unhistorical, make-believe world of Hollywood, and by the fantasies of immature teenage boys.
If readers could objectively view ancient Lakedaimon [Sparta] without being blinded by the fairy tale mirage, it should be obvious to all that the Lakedaimonians were no more the champions of democracy in their wars against the Persian Empire than the Soviet Union was the champion of democracy in its war against Nazi Germany during World War II. Both the Lakedaimonians and the Soviets were simply fighting for their own self preservation and neither had any love for democracy nor respect for the right of self determination on the part of any other nation. If he had survived the Persian War, Leonidas in all likelihood would have acted more like the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin than like a democratic leader such as Winston Churchill.
FOOTNOTES
[1]↩ Plutarch (Symposium of the Seven Sages 10) mentioned the death of a great Khalkidean warrior named Amphidamas, who died in battle during the war against the Eretrieans over the Lelanton (i.e. the Lelantine plain). The two great poets Homer and Hesiod supposedly competed for a prize at his funeral with Hesiod taking the tripod as the victor. Hesiod (Works and Days 650–659) himself confirmed his victory in this contest, but did not mention Homer! Herodotos (5.99) wrote that before the Ionian Revolt of ca. 499 BCE the Milesians of Ionia had aided the Eretrieans in war whereas the Samians of Ionia had come to aid the Khalkideans. Thoukydides (1.15.3) simply noted that palai (long ago) most of the other Greeks had sided as allies of either the Khalkideans or the Eretrieans in war. Strabon (10.1.12) recorded that in the dispute over the Lelanton, the Eretrieans and Khalkideans agreed to ban the use of missiles.
[2]↩ Aiskhines (Against Ktesiphon 3.107–112) briefly mentioned that the Amphiktyones declared war on the motion of Solon of Athens against the Kirrhaians, who were enslaved. Their port and city were razed to the ground and their lands were declared sacred. Pausanias (10.37.4–8) claimed that Krisa was the ancient name of Kirrha. He mentioned the tyrant Kleisthenes of Sikyon and the lawgiver Solon of Athens as the Amphiktyonic leaders in a successful war against Kirrha. Solon was credited with poisoning the River Pleistos with hellebore, which led to the capture of Kirrha. The late 1st Century CE Roman writer Sextus Julius Frontinus (Stratagems 3.7.6) claimed that it was Kleisthenes of Sicyon who poisoned the Krisaians’ water supply with hellebore. For the question of the historicity of the Krisaian War see: Noel Robertson. “The Myth of the First Sacred War”. The Classical Quarterly, New Series, vol. 28, no. 1 (1978), pages 38–73.
[3]↩ The statue’s connection with an inscribed base (not shown), which mentions Polyzalos and a ruler of Gela in Sicily, is problematic. For the statue’s date and the many issues regarding the inscribed base, see Gianfranco Adornato. “Delphic Enigmas? The Γέλας ἀνάσσων, Polyzalos, and the Charioteer Statue”. American Journal of Archaeology, vol. 112, no. 1 (Jan. 2008), pages 29–55.
[4]↩ The Thessalian basileus Kineas, a Koniaios man, was in all likelihood not a king, which is the standard meaning of basileus. Instead, Kineas was likely the military leader of the Thessalian koinon. Other Greek states used the title basileus even after the fall of their kings. For example, Athens had a magistrate called the arkhōn basileus.
Koniaios is an unknown Thessalian city ethnic (e.g. Larisaios for an individual from Larisa). It is possibly a typo for *Kondaios, which is theorized to have been the earlier form of Kondaieus, a Thessalian city ethnic used in a Hellenistic inscription. The proposed city name is *Kondaia, site unknown. (An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis: An Investigation Conducted by The Copenhagen Polis Centre for the Danish National Research Foundation. [Edited by] Mogens Herman Hansen and Thomas Heine Nielsen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Page 694)
[5]↩ Leslie J. Worley (Hippeis: The Cavalry of Ancient Greece. (History and Warfare). Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. Pages 51–53) argues that the Thessalian victory was “almost certainly a standard battle, with the Thessalian cavalry successfully attacking a phalanx”. Worley emphasizes the difficulty in surprising the Lakedaimonians [Spartans] and argues that common sense would have alerted their commander to the threat. I respond by pointing out that a veritable host of combatants have lost their lives in battle due to the lack of common sense on the part of their commanders! Nonetheless, Worley correctly points out that the Lakedaimonian hoplites almost certainly lacked cavalry and light infantry support and that the relatively small size of their force “meant that either the phalanx could not stretch across the entire plain and thus that the flanks were unprotected and the phalanx subject to flanking attack or encirclement or, alternatively, that to stretch across the plain, the phalanx was deployed thinly, less than the normal 8 men deep that the Spartans preferred. A thin phalanx was a weak one and one that could be broken.” However, Worley seems to ignore the fact that Herodotos wrote that the Thessalian cavalry attacked the Lakedaimonian stratopedon (camp or encamped army), which certainly implies that the Lakedaimonians did not have time to draw up their army for a standard battle.
[6]↩ I am working on a blog page entitled ‘The Myth of Spartan Invincibility’. In the meanwhile, here are two, additional examples that disprove the Lakedaimonian [Spartan] claim of invincibility and the assertion that they would refuse to surrender or to run for their lives.
The Lakedaimonians [Spartans] attacked Tegea in ca. 570/560 BCE and were so confident that they would easily vanquish the southeastern Arkadian city that they brought fetters with which to enslave the Tegeatans. However, the Tegeatans not only defeated the Lakedaimonians, but they even placed these fetters upon their numerous Lakedaimonian captives and set them to work in their fields. These very chains were displayed in the temple of Athena Alea in Tegea and both Herodotos (ca. 485–424 BCE) and Pausanias the periēgētēs (ca. 115–180 CE) reported that they were still on display in their own times. In addition, Pausanias reported that the Tegeatans celebrated a festival called Halōtia (Capture) to commemorate capturing the greater part of the Lakedaimonian army in battle. (Herodotos. 1.66; Pausanias. 3.7.3, 8.45.3, 8.47.2, 8.47.4)
Despite the idealistic exhortations of Tyrtaios (fragment 10) that a courageous warrior should “not be fond of life when doing battle” and that it is “a noble thing for a brave man to die having fallen in the front ranks doing battle for one’s fatherland”, the real life Lakedaimonians [Spartans] were clearly still fond of life and even submitted to being taken captive en masse on the battlefield in order to save their lives.
Years later, the Lakedaimonian king Kleomenes I (reigned ca. 520–490 BCE) intervened in Athens in ca. 508/507 BCE and ordered the Athenians to expel the Alkmaionid leader Kleisthenes, who had been promoting democratic reforms. Kleisthenes fled Attica and Kleomenes soon arrived with a small force, perhaps the customary 300 Spartiatai of the king’s bodyguard. Kleomenes exiled 700 Athenian households and then attempted to dissolve the Athenian Boulē (Council). Meeting with resistance, Kleomenes occupied the Athenian Acropolis. Thereupon, the Athenian populace rose up in support of the democratic reforms and laid siege to the Lakedaimonians on the Acropolis. Kleomenes was forced to surrender the Acropolis on the third day of the siege and depart Attica, but he was permitted to withdraw only with his Lakedaimonian troops. Shamelessly, the Lakedaimonians [Spartans] deserted their allies, who were put to death by the Athenian democrats! (Herodotos. 5.69–73; Aristotle. Constitution of the Athenians 19; Thoukydides. 1.126–127; Plutarch. Solon 12)
Kleomenes was the older half-brother of Leonidas I (reigned ca. 490–480 BCE) with a much more distinguished career than Leonidas. Sparta’s reputation was at its zenith at the time of the Persian Wars in no small part thanks to the cleverness and ruthlessness of Kleomenes, who apparently died at about the same time as the first Persian expedition against mainland Greece in 490 BCE. Kleomenes and his elite Lakedaimonian [Spartan] warriors on the Acropolis clearly had no intention of heroically fighting to the death in accordance with an impractical code of honour that did not permit either surrender or retreat. Instead, the real life Lakedaimonians made the rational decision to capitulate and ingloriously flee Attica in order to fight again another day in more favourable circumstances. This was completely contrary to the fanciful admonishments of the Lakedaimonian poet laureate Tyrtaios (fragment 12) that “all thought of foul flight” be “completely forgotten”.
However, what is far more damning to the Lakedaimonians’ heroic, martial reputation was their contemptible abandonment of their allies to their deaths in order to save their own skins! This cold-blooded and self-centred action should certainly raise considerable doubts about the likelihood that—roughly 27 years later at Thermopylai—Leonidas and 300 Spartiatai selflessly sacrificed their own lives in order to save other Greeks! Such a noble sacrifice would have been completely contrary to all we know about the mean spirited and egomaniacal Spartiatai. The far-fetched legend of Thermopylai—which is clearly not supported by the facts—is simply pro-Lakedaimonian propaganda which was promulgated in ancient times by anti-democratic, conservative authors and has been uncritically popularized in modern times by Nazi pseudoscience about the racial superiority of the Aryans (amongst whom the Nazis proudly included the ancient Spartans), by the unhistorical, make-believe world of Hollywood, and by the fantasies of immature teenage boys.
If readers could objectively view ancient Lakedaimon [Sparta] without being blinded by the fairy tale mirage, it should be obvious to all that the Lakedaimonians were no more the champions of democracy in their wars against the Persian Empire than the Soviet Union was the champion of democracy in its war against Nazi Germany during World War II. Both the Lakedaimonians and the Soviets were simply fighting for their own self preservation and neither had any love for democracy nor respect for the right of self determination on the part of any other nation. If he had survived the Persian War, Leonidas in all likelihood would have acted more like the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin than like a democratic leader such as Winston Churchill.
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